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Current  democratic  decision-making is  systematically  biased  in  favor  of  the present 
people, due to various psychological and institutional factors. Humans are short-termist 
by nature and willingly discount the interests of future generations, as exemplified by 
the  climate  crisis.  This  thesis  argues  that  climate  change  is  not  only  a  global 
coordination issue, but an instance of intergenerational domination, in which the present 
generation subjugates and violates autonomy of future generations. The technological 
progress  has  made  it  possible  for  us  not  only  to  affect  posterity,  but  to  arbitrarily 
determine the conditions of their actions, thereby dominating them. Future generations 
are vulnerable and without recourse against unconstrained power of the present people. 
This  violates  fundamental  human  interest  in  autonomy and  self-determination.  This 
expansive  conception  of  domination  is  defended  against  neorepublican  objections. 
Intergenerational  domination  is  an  insidious  structural  injustice  permeating  our 
institutions  and  even  many  of  the  supposed  remedies  to  climate  change,  such  as 
geoengineering.
I  argue  that  intergenerational  domination  can  only  be  overcome  by  instituting 
accountability and limiting the arbitrary power of the present generation. This can be 
achieved  by  granting  the  otherwise  voiceless  future  generations  representation  in 
decision-making. However, this has to be done carefully not to violate democratic rights 
of current people. Due to uncertainty, human biases and legitimacy concerns, I argue 
that public deliberation is our best option to institutionalize representation for posterity. 
This  deliberation  is  aimed  at  protecting  autonomy  of  future  generations  and 
empowering  them to exercise  their  democratic  sovereignty  in  the  future. Central  to 
deliberation  is  educative  perspective-taking  and public  reason-giving that  encourage 
people  to  adopt  the  viewpoint  of  posterity.  Deliberation  also  holds  present  people 
discursively accountable to the future by incentivizing them to justify their decisions to 
posterity as if they were present today. Evidence from deliberative mini-publics indicate 
that  they  do  indeed  lead  to  more  long-term  policies  and  consideration  of  future 
generations'  interests.  Public  deliberation  therefore  strikes  an  ideal  balance  between 
effectiveness and democratic legitimacy of representing posterity.
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Technological progress has rapidly propelled humanity into a new era. We now possess 
various means of wreaking havoc over the long-term with significant ramifications for 
our descendants. In contrast to the increasing technological power to affect the future, 
our institutions lack behind, exacerbating the problem of democratic short-termism. Our 
common sense morality and institutions have proven to be increasingly inadequate in 
the face of these global, intergenerational problems. We are morally myopic, and our 
concern  tends  to  be limited  to  select  few spatially  and temporally  close to  us.  The 
victims  of  these  collective  action  problems  are  predominantly  statistical  future 
generations whose potential suffering does not motivate us to take action. In contrast, 
common sense morality relies on closely related, clearly identifiable causes and victims 
(Jamieson 2014, 149). While we care deeply about those closest to us, such as family, 
community or even nation state, we lack compassion for those spatially and temporally 
distant  from  us.  These  short-sighted  moral  intuitions  also  permeate  our  current 
institutions and entrench the injustice on structural level. As a result, future generations 
are continuously disregarded and subjugated, as exemplified by the climate crisis. This 
intergenerational  problem  is  not  merely  an  issue  of  just  savings,  but  placing  the 
vulnerable posterity in unprecedented danger, thereby limiting their life choices. I argue 
that  by  arbitrarily  determining  the  conditions  of  posterity's  actions  the  current 
generation  continues  to  dominate  them  and  violate  their  autonomy.  Intergerational 
domination is a structural problem resulting from lack of accountability and safeguards 
against the arbitrary power of the present people. Therefore, it is of utmost importance 
that the power disparity is constrained by representing future generations in decision-
making,  thereby protecting popular sovereignty and democracy over time.  However, 
constitutionally  entrenched  representation  of  posterity  could  also  undermine  their 
freedom and violate democratic ideals. Self-imposed restrictions designed to empower 
the posterity have to amendable not to succumb to what they try to remedy.
I argue that public deliberation is both democratically legitimate and effective way of 
representing interests of future generations. Given the uncertainty of posterity's interests 
deliberation  is  an  ideal  way of  respecting  their  autonomy.  One might  argue  that  if 
intergenerational domination arises in part because of shortsighted voters, it cannot be 
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amended by democratic means either. If people are biased and short-termist by nature, 
surely they cannot be trusted to represent posterity's  interests?1 Yet the fact that our 
intuitive thinking is biased against the future is exactly why deliberation is needed to 
represent posterity. Public deliberation can affect the attitudes of citizens and curb the 
vices  of  common  sense  morality  by  motivating  long-term  thinking  and  providing 
incentives for people to consider the potential interests of posterity, even if they were 
not disposed to do so at first (MacKenzie 2018, 253). Some authors have argued in 
accordance with the all-affected principle2 that it is democratically illegitimate that the 
future generations, who are most affected by our decisions are not represented in their 
making.  My  approach  is  similar  yet  different.  The  argument  is  neither  that  future 
generations are harmed nor subject to democratic violations,  but that they are being 
dominated and denied of their autonomy.  In other words, my argument ties together 
both  justice-based  and  democracy-based  justifications  for  representation  of  future 
generations.3 This  is  why  both  the  effectiveness  and  democratic  legitimacy  of 
representation are central to my proposal, and why public deliberation is especially well 
placed to used to represent future generations.
This thesis shall start off by describing the common sense morality, which breeds our 
failure to take generational power discrepancies seriously.  Technological process has 
challenged  the  traditional  understanding  of  morality,  which  has  relied  on  single 
individual intentionally causing harm to someone close to them. Global climate change 
is one of the most striking examples of failures of common sense morality. As seen in 
the  second  chapter,  traditional  forms  of  analysis,  such  as  tragedy  of  the  commons 
approach  fail  to  truly  appreciate  the  intergenerational  aspect  of  climate  change.  As 
Stephen Gardiner (2011a) has argued, climate change is characterized by tyranny of the 
contemporary  and  intergenerational  buck-passing,  where  the  current  generation 
postpones the costs of climate change to future generations. But even this cooperation-
based account  obscures the power asymmetries  between generations:  as  posterity  is 
completely at the mercy of the present people, the situation is one of domination. The 
absolute power itself does not dominate posterity, but the fact that current generation is 
free to wield such power arbitrarily does.  When an agent is in position to arbitrarily 
1 For example, see Kates (2015).
2 According to the all-affected principle all those who are significantly affected by a decision ought to 
have a right to participate in the making of the said decision. See Ekeli (2005), Tännsjö (2007) and 
Bovenkerk (2015).
3 See Beckman (2013) for the distinction between democracy and justice-based justifications.
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shape conditions of another agent's actions, the latter is dominated because this violates 
her  autonomy. I  defend  this  expansive  conception  of  intergenerational  domination 
against neorepublican objections. According to my relational and structural notion of 
domination, structural power disparities violate posterity's freedom irrespective of their 
harmful outcomes. Consequently, present people's undue influence on posterity's lives 
ought  to  be  institutionally  constrained.  Representing  future  generations  in  decision-
making is a possible solution to establishing accountability. By disregarding future in 
decision-making we undermine posterity's opportunities to live a life according to their 
conception  of  the  good.  In the last  chapter  of  the  thesis  I  will  further  consider  the 
institutional ways and challenges of representing future generations in decision-making. 
Uncertainty  about  posterity's  values  along  with  biases  of  common  sense  morality 
suggest that such institutions should be focused on deliberative and educational forms 
of  representation.  While  constitutional  ways  of  constraining  the  power  of  current 
generation are desperately needed, such reforms have to be cautiously conducted not 
infringe on democratic rights of current people.
Before embarking, some preliminary remarks are in order. First, the term generation 
tends to be vague with no widely agreed definition or time-span. I will be focusing on 
non-overlapping generations, who do not exist at the same time and cannot interact with 
each  other.  The  focus  on  the  distant  and unborn  future  generations  is  illuminating, 
because the longer the time frame, more challenging the ethical problems.  Secondly, 
this thesis does not seek to present a comprehensive account of intergenerational justice 
or of our duties to future generations. Rather, it showcases how anthropogenic climate 
change  breaches  the  minimum  of  what  we  owe  to  posterity:  not  to  violate  their 
autonomy. I will presume that there are at least some basic interests and rights, such as 
personal autonomy that future generations are entitled to. As to how exactly these rights 
exist  does  not  fall  within  the  scope  of  this  inquiry,  even  if  there  is  considerable 
disagreement  about  these  issues.  Third,  I  will  not  consider  the  classic  non-identity 
problem in detail.4 The generational autonomy view explicit in the argument should be 
4 According to Derek Parfit's (1984) non-identity problem, future individuals cannot be said to be 
harmed by our actions because their existence is conditional on those same actions. Under different 
environmental policies different individuals would be conceived, and thus no-one is made worse-off. 
The non-identity problem has had numerous convincing answers, including impersonal effects of 
action, threshold notions of harm and distinguishing harm from having been made worse-off. See 
Roberts (2019) and Meyer (2016). I would also add that when it comes to representation of posterity, 
it does not follow that future people would necessarily be in favor of policies that led to their 
existence, even if their lives are worth living, as authors like Tännsjö (2007) assume. For example, 
3
well suited to answer such objections because of its collective, rights-based focus. As 
the  problem is  not  that  we  harm future  persons,  but  the  fact  that  we  violate  their  
impersonal, generational rights, it is irrelevant which particular human beings will exist 
in the future. The pivotal point is that future people’s rights are violated by the arbitrary 
power exercised by present generation. This is also important because acts that do not 
explicitly  harm future generations,  can  still  violate  their  autonomy.  Fourth,  when it 
comes to the common sense morality and empirical issues of moral psychology, some 
skepticism is of course justified. It might be argued that the outlook presented here is 
overly  stark  and that  people  do  hold  genuine  intergenerational  concerns,  which  are 
disregarded by current democratic institutions. To clarify, I am not arguing that people 
do not care about future generations, but that other short-term interest often override 
these concerns. At the very least there is a significant value-action gap which is not 
solely  reducible  to  institutions.  Therefore,  a  collective  value  change  that  public 
deliberation facilitates is essential. While common sense morality  helps to explain the 
drivers  and causes  of  institutional  short-termism,  it  is  not  strictly  necessary for  the 
arguments of the subsequent chapters. Therefore, one does not necessarily have to agree 
with the analysis  of presentist  bias to  find the later  parts  compelling.  Regardless,  it 
should help us give a background for why current institutional arrangements have failed 
future  generations,  and  why  educative  deliberation  is  needed  to  represent  future 
generations. Lastly,  this thesis is based on the scientific consensus on anthropogenic 
climate change and will only examine it from a limited anthropocentric viewpoint. The 
harm climate change imposes on non-human nature is certainly morally problematic, 
but outside the realm of this thesis.
had I been given a choice, I would not have supported the WWII despite it being one of the 
preconditions for my rather pleasant existence.
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2. Common sense morality
Common sense morality refers to set of basic moral norms that hold for a wide variety 
of  different  human  societies,  presumably  due  to  humanity's  evolutionary  history. 
Human beings have lived in tight-knit, technologically deprived societies for nearly all 
of their history. This is also where our sense of morality has evolved in, leading to at 
least three important consequences. First, human morality is focused on the short-term 
consequences  of  our  actions.  The  far  future  is  unlikely  to  factor  into  our  moral 
considerations, especially if they are only affected indirectly. Secondly, our moral circle 
tends to be restricted to those closest to us, both temporally and spatially. Thirdly, the 
focus on near-term well-being of our close ones has rendered us myopic and incapable 
empathy when it  comes to suffering of larger collectives.  This  is  not least,  because 
large-scale  harm is  often  tied  to  social  structures,  which  function  independently  of 
individual's intentions. We do not see ourselves responsible for allowing harm to occur, 
if we have not caused it directly as individuals. These dispositions facilitate collective 
action  problems  that  wrong  distant  people.  (Persson  &  Savulescu  2012,  Ch  2.) 
Humanity's  spatial  and  temporal influence  used  to  be  rather  limited,  but  scientific 
discoveries have drastically expanded our powers. For example, consumption of fossil 
fuels enables us to benefit ourselves by imposing costs on the future. Our limited moral 
psychology is bound to lead to tragedy as technological process has enabled humanity 
to  indirectly  wreak  havoc  over  long  distances  and  time-frames.  Common  sense 
morality, suited for life in small communities with limited technology has now turned 
on itself, contributing to moral catastrophe.
Research in moral psychology suggests that morality has evolved to make cooperation 
within  groups  possible,  as  this  poses  evolutionary  advantage  (Haidt  2012,  Greene 
2013). But as Joshua Greene has suggested, our current tragedy is that the same moral 
reasoning that enabled cooperation within groups now undermines cooperation between 
groups in a globalized world. Morality did not develop to advance universal cooperation 
and  can  even  lead  to  active  animosity  towards  outsiders  and  out-group  members. 
Rather,  it  evolved  to  efficiently  compete  against  other  groups,  leading  to  conflict 
between  Us versus Them.  (Greene 2013, 26.) Moral emotions that make small  scale 
cooperation possible  – feelings of empathy,  friendship, gratitude,  shame, and guilt  – 
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lose their force in global moral problems which implicate those spatially and temporally 
distant from us. Future generations cannot shame us for our wrongdoing, eliminating 
guilt as a motivator to action. Tragedy of common sense morality is then that our tribal 
group inclinations  crowd out our impartial  concern for others.  Our tribal beliefs are 
easily biased, resistant to facts and distort our sense of fairness. (Greene 2013.) These 
group identities motivate who we see as worthy of moral consideration and those we do 
not, going against the ideal of human moral equality.  Common sense morality is still 
tied  to  our  tribal  nature,  obscuring  our  pressing  obligations  to  distant  others. 
Simultaneously  there  has  been  steady  progress  throughout  history  towards  more 
inclusive moral circle encompassing more cultures and nations (Singer 2011). We have 
shifted our identities from hunter-gatherer groups of 150 people to larger collectives, 
such as nation states and have even endorsed ideals such as universal human rights. 
While there are still  great strives to be made towards more global and cosmopolitan 
morality where everyone is considered moral equal, there is one, especially large and 
discredited group which lacks moral consideration – future generations. This is largely 
connected to psychological factors that make people prone to discounting the future.
Simon Caney (2016) discusses how political  nearsightedness is connected variety of 
psychological factors. Aside from the institutional explanations such as electoral and 
economic  dependence  of  politicians,  short-term  performance  indicators  and  media 
coverage,  harmful short-termism also arises due to various qualities of human nature. 
Such  biases  include  self-interest,  weakness  of  the  will,  procrastination,  positive 
illusions, vividness and invisibility of the problem, creeping problems and identifiable 
victim syndrome.  Humans  are motivated  by immediate  risks,  which they personally 
experience, but ignore intangible, scientific warnings. Furthermore, we have tendency to 
ignore problems which gradually worsen and so to speak, creep up on us. Identifiable 
victim syndrome is well studied phenomenon in which people care more strongly about 
suffering of identifiable  individuals  in comparison to statistical  victims.5 Death of a 
single  individual  evokes  empathy and outrage  whereas  thousands  of  victims  due to 
insufficient health care cause no such reactions. Since the future generations are only 
representable in statistical,  non-personal ways,  they are likely to enjoy little concern 
5 Studies have found that people are much more likely to donate to for the well-being of single 
individuals rather than to large, statistical groups of people, even though the latter would result in 
much more welfare. Other things being equal, our compassion and willingness to help negatively 
correlates with the number of victims in a tragedy. See Slovic (2007).
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from current people. (Caney 2016, 143-145.) These factors are further exacerbated by 
our group identities which pit us against each other. In fact, there is a third driver of 
short-termism which  functions  at  the  intersection  of  human  biases  and  institutions: 
political polarization. Politics have become increasingly partisan, divided and fractured 
along  party  and  identity  cleavages  across  the  world.  As  political  decision-making 
becomes ever more identity-based, the temptation of tribalism and  Us vs Them views 
increase. This results in declining trust in government and gradual decline of democratic 
institutions, which have all been well documented. (McCoy, Rahman & Somer 2018.) 
Erosion  of  democratic  norms,  trust  and  tolerance  of  other  parties  all  threaten 
cooperation  and foresight  required  to  tackle  emerging  global  threats.  As  politics  is 
reduced to tribal allegiances and scoring wins against opposition, long-term interests are 
ignored as there is no common ground which to base these values on. Cooperation is 
seen  as  weakness,  despite  being  necessary  for  addressing  long-term  problems  of 
humanity. As Jamieson (1992, 151) points out, addressing problems like climate change 
requires  collective  moral  change,  which  is  fundamentally  cooperative  rather  than 
coercive endeavor.
Common sense morality leads us astray in regard to long-term problems by contributing 
to pure time discounting. Experiments show that people place less moral importance on 
far-off suffering, even though this is hardly morally defensible (Green 2013, 260). It is 
hard to justify why pure time preference should play into considerations of moral status. 
Punishing a person merely because they were born later in time would be to hurt them 
through no fault of their own (Caney 2014, 234). Indeed, it has long been recognized 
that the pure temporal distance of harm is irrelevant. There is no universal reason to 
favor the present over the future, and pure time discounting is a form of indefensible 
myopia. (Lagerspetz 1999, 151.) There is no moral reason to give less weight to human 
interests the further into the future they are.6 Surely it is just as morally abhorrent to 
plant a bomb in a school which goes off in 100 years rather than tomorrow? A yearly 
discount rate of 3 percent would preposterously mean that a person born today would be 
twice as morally valuable as someone born 25 years later (Gardiner 2011a, 276). Aside 
from violating moral equality of persons and leading to absurd conclusions, pure time 
discounting also leads to suboptimal use of resources across generations (Caney 2014, 
6 This is not to say that growth discounting and uncertainty could not justify some limited deference of 
costs to future. See Caney (2014). However, while discounting future benefits might be justifiable 
due to uncertainty over the future, there is no general justification for it (Lagerspetz 1999).
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234). These problems are equally clear in the case of discounting physical distance. 
Despite our common sense intuitions, whether someone is 5 or 5000000 meters away 
from us  should  not  on  its  own affect  their  moral  status.  Discounting  is  also  often 
motivated by uncertainty regarding the future. As the consequences of present decisions 
remain unknown, future risks are discounted because of their uncertainty. In contrast, 
Henry Shue has argued that this does not hold in the case of climate change. Robust 
climate action is required under the following conditions:
“(1) massive loss: the magnitude of the possible losses is massive; (2) threshold 
likelihood:  the  likelihood  of  the  losses  is  significant,  even  if  no  precise 
probability  can be specified,  because (a)  the mechanism by which the losses 
would occur is well understood, and (b) the conditions for the functioning of the 
mechanism  are  accumulating;  and  (3)  non-excessive  costs:  the  costs  of 
prevention are not excessive…” (Shue 2014, 265). 
Uncertainty does not justify inaction, in fact the opposite. The unknown probability of 
the massive losses does not support the assumption that the chances of them are minor. 
Given how catastrophic such losses would be, chances of them occurring ought to be 
minimized. This is more so, because the climate system is characterized by potentially 
dangerous tipping points and feedback loops. It appears that we are at the times-of-last-
opportunity when it comes to avoiding many of these lock-in effects. The burden of 
climate action can hardly be deferred into the future as inaction risks irreversible losses 
and catastrophic dangers. Uncertainty is therefore an urgent reason for action.  (Shue 
2015, 88-90.) Of course, the tendency to discount the future is only natural given what 
we know about the origin of our common sense morality. Human capacity for empathy 
evolved to promote reciprocity and cooperation within specific groups.7 Therefore it is 
no surprise that our tribal morality is biased towards identifiable individuals closest to 
us. Our indifference to the suffering of faraway statistical victims is due to intuitive, 
inflexible  gut  reactions  overcoming  careful  moral  consideration. We  confound  our 
morally relevant connections, such as causation, benefiting or capacity with irrelevant 
factors such as physical distance or time. We might well have special obligations to 
those closest to us in the light of our morally relevant connections, say the capacity to 
alleviate their suffering, but this does not diminish our general responsibilities to distant 
7 In other words, there is no biological advantage to being universally empathetic (Greene 2013, 262).
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others.
In a global world the common sense morality holds back humankind's ability to address 
our largest problems. In essence our morality is restricted to those closest to us both 
spatially and temporally.  Dale Jamieson has forcefully claimed that evolution did not 
design humans to recognize or solve problems of climate change's time scale. Even if 
we care for some future people, this is usually limited to our children and grandchildren. 
It  is  nearly impossible  to  empathize  with  people  thousands  of  years  apart  from us, 
whose lives and interest  are  completely foreign to us.  Nor is  there a possibility  for 
reciprocity, which is a central concept for our common sense morality. (Jamieson 2014, 
165-166.) Furthermore, the invisible, gradual and indirect nature of climate change does 
not  stimulate  our emotional  brain which is  wired to  respond to immediate  sense of 
danger (Marshall 2014). Climate change fails to incite deep feelings of disgust or anger 
and therefore we do not  feel  urgency for  action.  Common sense morality  runs into 
problems when faced with structural problems in which uncoordinated actions of the 
many result in future harm. Issues such as climate change overwhelm moral machinery 
of humans: the moral severity of the problem negatively correlates with our motivation 
to address it. This especially visible in the concept of responsibility, which is perhaps 
the most essential part of our moral motivation.
2.1. Responsibility
Dale Jamieson has argued that the western value system evolved in low-technology and 
low-population societies with abundance of resources. This has made our account of 
responsibility one that “presupposes that harms and their causes are individual, that they 
can be readily identified, and that they are local in time and space.” (Jamieson 1992, 
148.) But issues like climate change do not fit to these paradigm cases since their causes 
and effects are dispersed both spatially and temporally, and seemingly innocent acts of 
many can result in devastating consequences. Thus, we face “the possibility that the 
global environment may be destroyed, yet no one will be responsible.” (Jamieson 1992, 
149). Jamieson has later demonstrated this with his Jack and Jill example.
1. “Jack intentionally steals Jill's bicycle.“
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This is a paradigm case of moral responsibility,  because 1) an individual knowingly 
harms another individual, 2) both the perpetrator and the victim are clearly identifiable, 
and 3) they are closely related in space and time. It is easy to see that Jack committed a  
wrong and hold him accountable. But if we extrapolate by making the perpetrator an 
unstructured  collective,  reduce  spatial  and  temporal  proximity  and  minimize  the 
contribution to harm, we end up with scenario that resembles climate change:
6. “Acting independently, Jack and a large number of unacquainted people set in 
motion a chain of events that causes a large number of future people who will 
live in another part of the world from ever having bicycles.” (Jamieson 2014, 
149-150.)
Here the morally suspect nature of the situation has eroded away, even though the core 
remains the same: some people have harmed others with their actions (Jamieson 2014, 
150).8 Despite the moral wrongdoing, the concept of individual responsibility fails to 
identify any individuals who would be at fault. Conventional morality fails to assign 
responsibility  for  harms that  no single individual  caused,  intended or  foresaw. This 
illuminates  why everyday behavior,  such as flying  to  exotic  vacation  is  not  usually 
recognized  as  negligent  or  reckless  behavior.  As  the  agents,  victims,  and  causality 
become blurred so does responsibility.  Jamieson's example 6 might be too innocuous 
description of climate change though. As Stephen Gardiner notes, the example does not 
capture  how  the  affluent  claim  unfair  portion  of  the  global  public  goods,  thereby 
unnecessarily imposing a  risk of significant harm on the poor. Loss of a bicycle does 
not  represent  the  severe  harm  posed  by  climate  change,  nor  does  it  arise  as  a 
consequence of rather frivolous consumption patterns of the rich. (Gardiner 2011b, 43-
44.)9 Now, it is true that accounting for these factors results in a more accurate view of 
the climate injustice, thereby giving some traction for the concept of responsibility. But 
Jamieson (2013, 43) is not claiming that the acts contributing to climate change ought to 
be seen as instances of example 6, but rather that our common sense morality makes it 
appear so. It is exactly the aforementioned power disparities between the rich, poor and 
future that common sense morality blinds us from. As a result, people tend to see their 
actions  as  analogous  to  example  6,  resulting  in  greatly  diminished  sense  of 
8 Jamieson (2014, 151) does not claim that harm causation necessarily leads to moral responsibility.
9 Also see Gardiner (2017b).
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responsibility  and motivation  to  tackle these injustices.  As Jamieson has  concluded: 
“Unless  we  develop  new  values  and  conceptions  of  responsibility,  we  will  have 
enormous difficulty in motivating people to respond to this problem.” (Jamieson 1992, 
150).
2.2. Motivation
Even if assigning blame and fault to individuals were possible, it is unlikely that the 
traditional model of responsibility would be particularly effective in motivating climate 
action. As George Marshall has written, blame breeds resentment and activates personal 
defense mechanisms, which makes people less likely to shoulder the burden. This also 
creates  an  undesirable  Us vs  Them dichotomy and enemy narrative,  which leads  to 
further polarization and hampers the required cooperative responses to climate change. 
Instead,  what  is  needed  is  a  common  purpose  and  a  sense  of  belonging.  Without 
common ownership of the problem there is little hope to motivate people to take on 
responsibility. Unfortunately, as common sense morality dictates, such burden sharing 
is usually only seen within small, homogenous groups that conceive of themselves as 
acting together. The challenge is then to expand our moral circle by building consensus 
and narrative around cooperation and shared interests. Asserting wider values to the 
common ground assists in establishing a positive vision of the future and communal 
hope for change. (Marshall 2014.) Global long-term problems therefore require people 
to overcome their tribal in- and out-group divisions.
Motivation deficiency to address long-term problems such as climate change is also 
exacerbated by the fact that the usual moral emotions and reciprocity cannot be relied 
on. Acting on behalf of future generations is more reliant on authentic moral motives 
because we struggle to feel love, compassion or solidarity towards those who do not yet 
exist and neither can they benefit us reciprocally (Birnbacher 2009, 281). One could 
argue that we can be indirectly motivated to care for the future through a chain of love 
where each generation cares for their  immediate descendants (Birnbacher 2009, 285). 
While it is true that we are greatly concerned about the well-being of our children and 
grandchildren  this  does  not  seem to  be  particularly  motivational  against  competing 
short-term interests, as seen in the current climate crisis. Furthermore, the chain of love 
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would only account for near-term problems which affect our immediate  descendants 
while  disregarding long-term future.  The myopia  would still  persist  as many of our 
decisions have their  most significant  effects in the far future.  In the case of climate 
change,  reliance  on the  chain  of  love  would  likely  emphasize  near-term adaptation 
policies at  the cost of genuine mitigation,  leading to exacerbated future damages.  In 
addition, these accounts face intergenerational collective action problems, meaning that 
we cannot trust that our successors will comply and finish our projects. The lack of 
credible commitment therefore imperils the first generation's motivation to take action. 
Some have argued that our failure to take the interests of future generations into account 
is merely an institutional issue.10 Yet this ignores how institutions and norms reflect 
broader values and priorities of the society. Institutional reform is not separable from 
transformation of values.
In conclusion, globalization and technological advances mean that human interaction is 
no longer restricted to local communities where morality evolved. But it is not only the 
global  aspect  where  common sense morality  lacks  behind.  Our increasing  power  to 
affect future generations also creates additional, intergenerational aspect where morality 
has not kept up with the technological progress. These power asymmetries are further 
entrenched by our political institutions. Humans have evolved to express moral concern 
for  their  local  in-group  members  at  the  cost  of  those  who  are  geographically  or 
temporally  distant.11 To only be concerned for those closest  to  us likely helped our 
ancestors  to  survive.  But  the  evolutionary  basis  of  our  moral  intuitions  is  not  a 
justification for them. Conversely, it seems that the current global problems have arisen 
in large-part due to our limited view of morality. Our traditional moral conceptions are 
based in low-population groups which lead us to disregard these distant outsiders. It 
therefore  comes  as  no  surprise  that  problems  such  as  climate  change,  which 
predominantly  threaten  distant  future  generations  have  not  been  acted  upon.   The 
pervasiveness of the problem is no accident given the mismatch between our moral and 
technological  capacities.  I  will  now move  on to  consider  why climate  change  is  a 
problem  of  intergenerational  domination,  rather  than  a  mere  global  coordination 
problem, as is the prevalent view.
10 See Gardiner (2017, 29). This point also ties into the importance of educative deliberation in Chapter 
4.
11 One can confirm this in practice by having an even brief look at media outlets and their reporting 
priorities. 
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3. Climate change as intergenerational domination
Climate change poses risks to fundamental human needs because of increased food and 
water  scarcity,  droughts,  diseases,  floods,  natural  disasters,  depletion  of  ecosystems 
along with other  numerous  harms (IPCC 2014, 2–8).  Indirect  social  effects  such as 
migration,  economic  downturn  and  conflicts  are  also  likely  to  contribute  to  more 
instability.  The moral  nature of climate change is  characterized by enormous power 
discrepancies. Those historically least responsible for greenhouse gas emissions are the 
ones bearing the heaviest effects of climate change. There is only a limited amount of 
greenhouse gasses that can be emitted into the atmosphere before dooming the planet to 
catastrophic levels of warming.12 This means that emission are fundamentally a zero-
sum game where luxury emissions of the rich are derived from the same finite pool as 
the subsistence emissions  of the poor and future generations.  The result  is a double 
damage: emissions of the rich both harm those most vulnerable and unfairly seize their 
share of the dwindling supply of emission rights (Shue 2015, 10).  In crude terms, the 
continued luxury emissions then essentially rob future generations of right to life.
The  most  disturbing  feature  of  the  moral  landscape  of  climate  change  is  its 
intergenerational  dimension.  Climate  change  is  a  back-loaded  phenomenon  as  the 
emissions continue to affect the atmosphere for centuries. Benefits of the emissions are 
derived instantly yet the costs are deferred into the future. We are thereby imposing 
unprecedented  dangers  to  severely  vulnerable  future  generations  who  are  woefully 
incapable of defending themselves. This is not merely a failure to protect someone's 
rights but inflicting grave risk on the innocent and the defenseless for frivolous reasons. 
Worst  of  all,  climate  inaction  can  lead  to  runaway  climate  change  where  severe 
problems are transformed into irreversible  and catastrophic  outcomes.13 (Shue 2014, 
272-274.) Despite this, climate change has usually been analyzed as an international 
coordination  problem,  a  tragedy  of  the  commons,  where  rationally  self-interested 
behavior leads to collectively adverse outcome. But this ignores the detrimental effects 
12 It is generally agreed that no more than trillion tonnes of carbon dioxide can be emitted cumulatively 
if the temperature rise is to be restricted to 2ºC above pre-industrial levels (Shue 2014, 297). 
However, even an increase of 1.5ºC is set to have devastating impacts on many vulnerable 
communities (IPCC 2018).
13 Irreversibility is a real concern which carries moral weight. Consider Derek Parfit's (1984, 453) 
extinction example: surely a nuclear war killing all of human population is magnitudes worse 
outcome than the war killing merely 99 % of the population.
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of climate change on posterity's autonomy. The moral issue of climate change cannot be 
understood  without  reference  to  intergenerational  domination  –  subjugation  of  the 
future generations.
3.1. The Global aspect
The global nature of climate change is usually well recognized even by traditional forms 
of analysis.14 Greenhouse gas emissions from around the world affect the global climate 
with no regard for national boundaries. These emissions remain in earth's atmosphere 
for  centuries  and  continue  to  affect  it  in  unpredictable  ways.  Both  the  causes  and 
impacts of climate change are dispersed across the globe. Consequently, climate change 
is not caused by any individual agent, but rather signals widespread institutional failure. 
(Gardiner 2011a, 24.) Accordingly, climate change is often seen as the world’s largest 
collective  action  problem,  analyzed  through  prisoner's  dilemma  or  tragedy  of  the 
commons framework (Gardiner 2011a, 28). In principle the spatial  aspect of climate 
change can be solved by wider international cooperation, but without effective global 
governance the solution remains difficult. The original tragedy of the commons analysis 
by  Garrett  Hardin  (1968)  considers  shepherds  grazing  cattle  on  a  common  land. 
Shepherds keep all the benefits of animal grazing to themselves, while costs such as soil 
depletion and grass consumption are shared among all herders. As a result, shepherds 
always have incentive to graze more and more animals even if the pasture is already 
overcrowded. Rational behavior of the individuals ultimately results in outcome that is 
not in anyone's interest, that is, the destruction of the commons. The paradoxical nature 
of the tragedy of the commons situation can be represented as follows:
1. “It is collectively rational to cooperate: each agent prefers the outcome produced 
by everyone cooperating over the outcome produced by no one cooperating.
2. It is individually rational not to cooperate: when each agent has the power to 
decide  whether  or  not  she  will  cooperate,  each  (rationally)  prefers  not  to 
cooperate, whatever the others do.” (Gardiner 2011a, 104.)15
14 The sections 3.1. and 3.2. will largely rely on Stephen Gardiner's (2011) distinction between the 
global and intergenerational storms of climate change.
15 These principles will be later (p. 18) referenced as TC1 and TC2.
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Tragedy of  the  commons  analysis  appears  valid  for  climate  change  as  well.  Every 
country wants to avoid catastrophic climate change through cooperation, but at the same 
time  short-term  economic  incentives  prevent  them  from restricting  emissions.  Free 
riding by continuing to use fossil fuels and pollute yields competitive advantage over 
countries that would cooperate. Therefore, each individual country refrains from action 
despite it being in their collective interest to enact restrictions.16 (Gardiner 2011a, 28.) 
Essentially,  climate  change  is  then  a  collective  action  problem  caused  by  lack  of 
cooperation  due  to  adverse  incentives.  Fortunately,  such  problems  can  be  resolved 
through cooperation and introduction of enforceable sanctions which punish free riding. 
Individual and collective rational action are then aligned in favor of cooperation. What 
is  required  in  practice  is  a  system  of  global  governance  which  enables  reliable 
regulation of emissions.
But  analyzing  climate  change  merely  as  an  issue  of  international  cooperation 
underestimates  complexity of  the problem  – it  is  not  pessimistic  enough.  As noted, 
solving tragedy of the commons situations is normally feasible in the real world. As 
parties notice that their unilateral actions leave everyone, including themselves worse 
off  than they would otherwise be,  they are likely motivated  to cooperate.  (Gardiner 
2011a,  115.)  For  example,  it  has  been  argued  that  local  communities  can  resolve 
commons  problems  in  stable  situations  where  use  of  resources  can  be  effectively 
monitored and regulated by excluding the noncooperators. This requires frequent face-
to-face communication and social interaction that enables parties to trust each other and 
observe emotional reactions to noncompliance.  (Dietz, Ostrom & Stern 2003, 1908.) 
But climate change lacks most of these features; social interaction is limited, support for 
regulation  varies  and  excluding  outsiders  is  challenging.  Climate  change  cannot  be 
mitigated  by  local  communities  alone  but  requires  coordinated  global  action. 
Preconditions  for  effective  cooperation  are  therefore  largely  absent.  Furthermore, 
addressing climate change entails profound social consequences which threaten vested 
economic interests. Uncertainty about the magnitude and impacts of climate change also 
complicate the situation further. (Gardiner 2011a, 117.) 
16 This is admittedly simplified version, as Gardiner notes. There are various complicating factors 
which make cooperation either more or less likely to occur. Tragedy of the commons is an evolving 
tragedy which involves multiple marginal decisions which are subject to new information. 
Furthermore, budget constraints of the agents, possible thresholds in the degradation of the commons 
and undercutting feedbacks can alter the willingness to cooperate. The overall framework 
nevertheless remains applicable. (Gardiner 2011a, 110-113.)
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Another  issue  which  the  commons  analysis  disregards  is  international  fairness. 
Interpreting climate change merely as an issue of securing cooperation between states 
carries risk of neglecting unfair background circumstances. In reality, parties do not face 
identical  costs  and  benefits  from  cooperation.  Climate  change  is  characterized  by 
skewed  vulnerabilities  and  uneven  historical  responsibility.  Rich  industrialized 
countries are the main perpetrators of dangerous climate change, but are least vulnerable 
to it due to the economic benefits they have accrued from contributing to the problem. 
On the other hand, those most vulnerable to climate change are least responsible for it. 
This includes poor countries of the global south who lack resources for adaptation and 
that are disproportionately situated in areas worst affected by rising temperatures and 
sea levels. (Gardiner 2011a, 119.) The power to affect and adapt to climate is unevenly 
distributed on the global scale.
So far it has been shown that even the global aspect of climate change is not adequately 
captured by tragedy of the commons approach. But matters become worse when we 
consider temporal dimensions of climate change. While in principle it is possible for the 
current poor to resist domination and place demands on the affluent countries, no such 
possibility  exists  in  the  intergenerational  sphere.  The  above-mentioned  power 
discrepancies  will  prove  to  be  insurmountable  as  the  present  exercises  unregulated 
power over the posterity. Neglect of intergenerational justice is the main reason why 
tragedy  of  the  commons  account  provides  far  too  benign  interpretation  of  climate 
change. In fact, the intergenerational problem undermines the crucial assumption of the 
commons analysis according to which countries represent interests of their people in 
perpetuity. (Gardiner 2011a, 122-123.)
3.2. The Intergenerational aspect
The temporal and intergenerational aspect of climate change is what truly makes it a 
tragedy. Temporal dispersion of impacts and fragmentation of agency has devastating 
consequences  for  cooperation.  While  spatially  fragmented  agents  can  cooperate  in 
principle,  temporally  distant  agents  cannot  become  unified  by  definition  (Gardiner 
2011a,  34).  The  intergenerational  dimension  is  defined  by  what  Gardiner  calls  the 
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tyranny  of  the  contemporary.  One  way  to  conceptualize  this  is  to  think  of  self-
interested, non-overlapping generations, who are exclusively concerned about their own 
well-being.17 Now,  consider  two  types  of  temporally  dispersed  goods:  front-loaded 
goods, benefits of which are accrued immediately alongside substantially deferred costs 
which fall on later generations, and back-loaded goods, which substantially benefit later 
generations but impose some costs on current generation.18 Given the selfish motivation 
of these generations it is reasonable to assume they would produce front-loaded goods 
which would only benefit themselves marginally while imposing catastrophic costs for 
later groups. In general, we would expect current generation to oversupply front-loaded 
goods and undersupply back-loaded goods. Furthermore, the problem is cumulative: as 
the costs compound over time, later generations are likely to face escalating burdens 
from their predecessors.  (Gardiner 2011a, 150-151.) This is what Gardiner names the 
central  problem  of intergenerational  buck-passing.  If  we  can  secure  benefits  for 
ourselves by imposing severe costs on our successors (who cannot hold us accountable), 
the  temptation  to  do  so  is  high.  This  seems  unjust,  especially  when  the  costs  are 
catastrophic (starvation, disease or death) and the corresponding benefits are gratuitous 
luxuries like larger cars and exotic vacations. It appears that the current generations are 
guilty  of  serious  moral  wrongs  by  giving  no  consideration  to  basic  needs  of  their 
successors.  (Gardiner  2011a,  152-153.)  Furthermore,  intergenerational  buck-passing 
usually involves negative rights violations which are usually seen as especially stringent 
ethical obligations.19
Climate change is particularly potent soil for intergenerational buck-passing to occur. 
Greenhouse  gasses  have  prolonged  atmospheric  lifetimes  which  means  significant 
changes usually take centuries to occur. This suggests that emissions have immediate 
and concrete benefits for current people in the form of inexpensive energy, but most of 
the  serious  costs  are  likely  to  be  deferred  to  future  generations.  As  subsequent 
generations find themselves in the same position with the same incentives, such buck-
passing  has  high  probability  of  recurring.  Overconsumption  continues,  thereby 
17 In more detail, in his idealized "pure scenario" Gardiner (2011, 150) assumes generations whose 
interests are generation-relative, which do not overlap and are temporally distinct i.e. that later 
generations cannot have any causal impact on earlier groups.
18 Production of front-loaded goods can be taken to mean violation of our negative duties not to impose 
harm on others, whereas failing to produce back-loaded goods is failure to fulfill our positive duties 
to aid others.
19 Failure to provide back-loaded goods which would significantly benefit future generations might not 
be quite as serious but still seems morally suspect.
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exacerbating the climate crisis. (Gardiner 2011a, 123.) While the above might sound 
overly  stark  analysis  it  is  not  merely  an  idealized  model.  Existing  national  and 
international  institutions  appear  to  be biased against  concerns  of  future generations: 
excessive weight is given to the interest of current people. Climate change thereby poses 
a severe intergenerational collective action problem. The pure intergenerational problem 
(PIP) outlined before has a grievous structure which makes it incredibly challenging to 
resolve. This is revealed by applying it to the tragedy of the commons (TC) framework. 
The intergenerational problem might be formalized the same way as earlier:
1. “It is collectively rational for most generations to cooperate:  (almost)20 every 
generation  prefers  the  outcome  produced  by  everyone  cooperating  over  the 
outcome produced by no one cooperating.
2. It  is  individually  rational for  all  generations  not  to  cooperate:  when  each 
generation  has  the  power  to  decide  whether  or  not  it  will  cooperate,  each 
generation prefers not to cooperate, whatever the others do.” (Gardiner 2011a, 
162.)
As Gardiner  points out,  the constituent  claims  are worse than in  the tragedy of the 
commons cases,  which leads to iteration of the problem. In TC1, every agent prefers 
absolute cooperation over absolute noncooperation, but this is not necessarily the case 
in PIP1.21 The first generation in sequence does not prefer cooperation, as it has nothing 
to gain from it. It will therefore not cooperate due to its generation-relative concerns. 
Furthermore, this undermines later generations incentives to cooperate. Preferability of 
cooperation  is  based  on  the  benefits  produced  by  the  preceding  generations  also 
cooperating. If the first generation decides against cooperation (as is likely), then the 
subsequent generations will also decline to coordinate their actions, hence dooming the 
collective project. As for the second principle, TC2 usually arises because of practical 
obstacles  to  cooperation.  But  these  obstacles  can  be  overcome  by  enforcing 
communication,  trust  and  sanctions  through  institutions.  Conversely,  PIP2  is  not 
contingent. Collective cooperation is in the generation's interest only because it wants to 
avoid adverse effects of its predecessors' actions. But when a given generations has the 
power to cooperate, it is no longer bound to earlier generations, as these generations do 
20 This is an optimistic application of the 1st principle. Aims of different generations might not be as 
compatible due to the temporal dispersion. Despite the optimistic concession to the commons 
framework, intergenerational problem leads to even worse outcomes.
21 Refer back to page 14 for formulation of TC1 and 2.
18
not exist anymore, and have already either cooperated or not in the past. In other words, 
the pure intergenerational problem resists standard solutions to tragedy of the commons 
situations. The notions of reciprocity or broad self-interest of parties do not carry any 
weight  in  intergenerational  scenario.  As  parties  do  not  coexist,  no  interaction  or 
prospect  of  mutual  advantage  is  possible.  (Gardiner  2011a,  163-164.)  Defining 
characteristics  of  pure  intergenerational  problem  are  then  causal  asymmetry  and 
asymmetric  independence  of  interests.  Earlier  generations  can  unjustifiably  impose 
severe costs on future people, who have no causal influence over their predecessors. 
While  future  generations  have a  significant  amount  to  gain  or  lose from actions  of 
earlier generations, the reverse does not hold:  earlier generations are indifferent to the 
actions  of  later  ones.  (Gardiner  2011a,  165-166.)  Gardiner's  term  tyranny  of  the 
contemporary  fittingly  highlights  vulnerability  of  future  generations  to  their 
predecessors.
While humans are not exclusively self-interested, it seems clear that we tend to display 
much more concern for those closest to us than those spatially and temporally distant 
from us, as discussed in the previous chapter. As a result, group decision are largely 
motivated  by  short-term  considerations  which  suppress  intergenerational  concern. 
(Gardiner 2011a, 168.) The fact that humans do not exist in rigid generational clusters 
does  not  undermine  relevance  of  intergenerational  analysis  either.  Admittedly, 
generational overlap might mean more potential solutions due to increased reciprocity 
and personal attachment. But even if these factors manifest themselves, it is not likely 
that they would overpower the short-termism rooted in human biases.  The threat  of 
intergenerational  buck-passing  is  therefore  palpable  even  when  there  is  strong 
generational overlap. Most of the current political  institutions are defined by limited 
time-horizons and temporal  asymmetries  of power. Governments are focused on the 
next  election  cycle  and  voters'  short-term  interest  dominate  the  agenda  setting. 
Corporations are most focused on quarterly profits and meeting shareholders' volatile 
expectations. Furthermore, the power within these institutions also tends to accumulate 
to the oldest citizens. (Gardiner 2011a, 173-174.) The decision makers will often not 
even  be  alive  to  experience  effects  of  their  own  policies.  If  the  intergenerational 
problem seems likely to manifest itself in these ordinary cases, is appears even more 
potent in genuinely long-term issues such as climate change.22
22 Gardiner notes that even abrupt climate change is likely to lead to short-term adaptation strategies, 
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But the insistence to depict the intergenerational problem as a failure of cooperation 
seems misguided given the weak and non-reciprocal connections between generations. 
Coordination problems such as tragedy of the commons are characterized by  mutual  
vulnerability of parties – cooperation exposes them to exploitation.  Each side has to 
worry  whether  others  will  take  advantage  of  their  cooperation  by  defecting.  This 
reciprocal relationship is why defecting in prisoner's dilemma cases is seen as rational 
and justified. But no such common vulnerability exists in the intergenerational case. 
Cooperation or not, the present do not stand to be punished in any way by the future. 
While it  is true that current generation abandons some of the benefits of temporally 
diffuse  goods  by  cooperating,  this  is  the  case  regardless  of  whether  the  posterity 
complies or not. (Smith 2013, 216-219.) Contrary to classical cases, the current people 
know  exactly  what  they  are  giving  up  by  cooperating,  with  no  risk  of  exposing 
themselves to greater costs.23 While there is a coordination problem between current 
people  with  regards  to  global  climate  change,  in  intergenerational  realm  the  issue 
mostly resembles domination.24 The question is not one of cooperation but whether the 
present  generation  refrains  from exploiting  their  absolute  power  over  the  posterity. 
Intergenerational domination appears to rise as one of the main injustices of climate 
change.
3.3. Intergenerational domination
Definitions of domination are plentiful, but most are concerned with unrestricted and 
unjust  power  asymmetries.  To  speak  of  domination  is  to  resent  against  morally 
illegitimate power, which ought to be remedied.25 Iris Marion Young (1990, 38), for 
thereby giving insufficient consideration to the future. This gives rise to intergenerational arms race, 
a vicious cycle where future generations are forced to pollute even more on the grounds of self-
defense. In the face of serious climate tragedy each subsequent generation might feel justified in 
imposing unacceptable burdens on the future people, just to escape disaster themselves. (Gardiner 
2011a, 201-203.)
23 One could argue that the present is exposed to costs if their cooperation is wasted by future people 
who decide to free ride and consume more. However, the costs are hardly comparable to traditional 
cooperation problems – years in jail versus preference about far future left unsatisfied. Current 
generation never faces unseen material harm for their cooperation and will not even know what is the 
end result of their cooperation. (Smith 2013, 219.)
24 This is not to say that practices such as extortion are not prevalent in international climate 
negotiations.
25 See McCammon (2018, ch 1) for more extensive discussion.
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example  defines  domination  as  institutional  structures  which  violate  individual 
autonomy to determine  conditions  of one's  own actions.  Frank Lovett  has offered a 
more comprehensive account according to which an individual or group is dominated 
when  three  conditions  are  fulfilled:  1)  imbalance  of  power,  2)  dependency,  and  3) 
absence of rules (Lovett 2001, 101-104). In essence, a dominated agent is subject to 
superior, unconstrained power without a chance of exiting this relationship. On the basis 
of this criteria John Nolt has argued that the current generation dominates posterity via 
greenhouse gas emissions. There is considerable imbalance of power as our emissions 
unilaterally affect the future. Dependency condition is also met as future generations 
cannot exit this relation due to the very nature of time. Rules are also absent since the 
power is being wielded arbitrarily without commonly established law or constitution 
with  respect  to  posterity.  Nolt  adds  harm as  the  fourth  condition  to  only  focus  on 
harmful forms of domination.26 This is also clearly met as greenhouse gas emissions are 
likely to result in massive harm to future generations: droughts, floods, famines and 
consequent  violence  and  forced  migration.  (Nolt  2011,  62.)  Therefore,  the  current 
generation collectively dominates posterity with their emissions. Nolt highlights eight 
features prevalent in our domination of the posterity, which make it especially unjust:
1. It is domination of a majority by a minority
2. The subordinated are innocent of any harm to their dominators
3. The  subordinated  are  voiceless,  powerless  and  without  recourse  against  the 
domination
4. The motives for the domination are often frivolous
5. The  subordinated  have  reason  to  expect  beneficence,  not  harm,  from  their 
dominators
6. Many of the dominators have systematically denied the domination
7. The  domination  is  worst  for  those  who are  in  other  ways  already the  most 
disadvantaged
8. The harmful consequences of the domination will worsen rather than improve 
over time, diminishing long-term hope. (Nolt 2011, 66-68.)
26 I am compelled to agree with Smith (2013, 230 f.n.) that there is something fundamentally wrong in 
all cases of domination, even if this does not directly result in harm to the subject. Therefore, I 
disagree with Nolt that only harmful domination is morally problematic. Morally speaking, we ought 
to oppose benevolent dictators and eliminate dominative relationships whenever possible.
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These considerations reflect how climate change will continue to inflict unprecedented 
harm on  numerous  innocent  generations  far  into  the  future.27  In  contrast  to  many 
historical instances of domination, future victims of climate change are utterly voiceless 
and  without  power  to  resist  the  domination.  Furthermore,  the  domination  rests  on 
pompous consumption patterns and is systematically dismissed and ignored by those in 
power. The harm is also compounded as the descendants of the most vulnerable people 
will suffer the most. The moral weight of this enormous suffering is further exacerbated 
by the fact that the future people have a reason to expect us to only pass on benefits  
such as prosperity and science to them like our predecessors did for us. Yet we are 
likely to become the first generation to knowingly pass on huge, back-loaded costs on to 
posterity. These harms are set to exacerbate the farther into the future we look, thereby 
diminishing  hope of  a  better  tomorrow.  It  is  hard  to  question  the  injustice  of  such 
intergenerational domination.
Posterity’s  irredeemable  dependency  on  the  present  gives  the  current  generation 
enormous power to structure the choices available to the future generations. Theories of 
intergenerational justice have often disregarded this in favor of more traditional savings 
principles or compensation mechanisms. Indeed, if we conceptualize justice between 
generations  as reciprocity28 and fair  cooperation,  one might  say that  the present has 
fulfilled its duty to the future once it has ensured that the future receives its fair share 
(Smith 2013, 234). Fair share is  often defined in terms of wealth or technology for 
adaptation to climate change. But thinking about intergenerational justice in terms of 
distribution of material goods misses the underlying relationship of domination. Taking 
domination into account means that we cannot rely on technological responses such as 
geoengineering  which  exacerbates  domination  and  path-dependency.  Compensation 
based accounts of intergenerational justice are ultimately too narrow. The fact that we 
are also doing much that will benefit the posterity29 does not diminish the injustice of 
domination. Similarly to how slavery is not justified by the care master provides for his 
slaves, neither is intergenerational domination acceptable due to wealth we pass on to 
27 Nolt (2011, 66) roughly estimates that at least 100 billion people will be affected by our greenhouse 
gas emissions.
28 Anja Karnein (2015, 52) has also noted that indirect reciprocity suffers from restricted scope as it 
focuses on adjacent generations. This is inadequate because climate change does not only affect our 
immediate descendants.
29 One can think of accumulated wealth, scientific advances, medicine, infrastructure, institutions et 
cetera.
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the  future.  Even  if  we were  to  grant  that  the  we  do  more  good than  harm to  our  
descendants, this still does not justify the harm we are committing. (Nolt 2011, 70.) One 
has acted unjustly if he punches another person without their consent, regardless of how 
greatly  they  are  willing  to  reimburse  afterwards.  Compensating  or  conserving  is 
inadequate  approach  as  it  ignores  the  need  to  reform  the  dominant  institutions  or 
structures.  Fair  burden-sharing  does  not  resolve  intrinsically  problematic  power 
asymmetries between the present and future. Instead, one has to ask how to remedy a 
dynamic where the present is capable of unilaterally conditioning the lives of posterity.
This enables us to see the heart of intergenerational justice.  One of the most  innate 
human needs is to form and live according to our own conceptions of the good. This is 
gravely violated if we preempt posterity's choices. Therefore present generation ought 
to protect posterity's opportunities to live according to their conception of the good life. 
Brian Barry even calls for equal opportunity across generations that leaves posterity's 
options open, although he does not develop the idea further. (Barry 1997, 52.) Given 
that present policies can coercively impact autonomy of future people, we ought to take 
precautions to secure posterity's decisional agency. Genevieve Fuji Johnson has argued 
that imposing severe risks upon future generations would be deeply unjust, "not only 
because they could be harmful to future generations, but more specifically because they 
could limit the ability of future persons to make decisions as to how best to realize their  
individual and collective ends.” (Johnson 2007, 82.) The central question is whether we 
impact future generations far beyond the inevitable and so undermine their ability to 
live autonomous life. Distribution of planetary resources is only relevant insofar as it 
undermines future generations’ ability to live a self-directed and dignified life. (Karnein 
2015,  62-63.)  Large-scale  disruptions  such  as  climate  change  do  not  only  lead  to 
destruction, but also force future generations to a situation where they no longer have 
the liberty to choose the course of their  own lives.  The destabilized climate coerces 
future  people  into  pooling  their  resources  towards  their  mere  survival.  While  our 
predecessors have always affected the choices available to posterity, future generations' 
lives may no longer just be impacted,  but determined to a large degree due to their 
ancestors' failure to take decisive climate action. People have a right not to have their 
lives determined and dictated by others beyond their control. Accordingly, what we owe 
to future is  not  to exert  undue influence on them. Current generation has to  ensure 
posterity's life opportunities to lead self-directed lives by not violating their right to be 
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free  from  undue  influence.  (Karnein  2015,  63-64.)  We  are  not  only  harming  the 
posterity  but  imposing our own values  and preferences  on the them,  thereby taking 
away their ability to dictate the course of their own lives. This is what intergenerational 
domination is – subjugating future in a way that is inimical to their autonomy.
It has already been pointed out that domination depicts  the power relations between 
generations  more  accurately  than  any  cooperative  scheme.  Moreover,  focusing  on 
autonomy is essential  in intergenerational cases because of the uncertainty regarding 
interests of future people. We lack knowledge about preferences and values of future 
generations. The future might look drastically and unfathomably different, presenting us 
with an epistemic challenge we remain oblivious to. As we can only know some of the 
very basic interests of posterity, it would be problematic to make strong assumptions 
regarding what the future generations might value.30 Given the variety of preferences the 
posterity might hold, we ought not to restrict their choices needlessly. In other words, 
uncertainty provides a compelling reason to protect posterity's capacity to make their 
own collective decisions (Thompson 2010, 22). Respecting autonomy of posterity is 
therefore a direct answer to the uncertainty problem. In the same vein, Johnson argues 
that  both  utilitarian  and  deontological  theories  are  too  indeterminate  because  of 
uncertainty  and  ignorance  about  future's  interests.  The  uncertainty  caused  by  the 
inevitable cultural and moral change means we can never know nor protect values of 
future  generations.  (Johnson  2013,  109.)  Traditional  theories  of  justice  fail  in 
intergenerational cases because they rely on reference to specific individuals and their 
interests (Thompson 2010, 27). This suggests that a better basis for intergenerational 
justice lies in structural power inequalities between generations, and in our contribution 
to  those  disparities.  The  domination  analysis  takes  this  into  account  by  respecting 
autonomy of future people and ensuring that they are in charge of their own lives.31 If 
we value that future generations can live according to their own conception of the good, 
curbing domination is of up most importance. This is in line with how climate change is 
characterized  by various  irreversible  outcomes,  feedback loops and lock-in effects.32 
30 Further complicating factor is that our decisions also impact preferences and values of future 
individuals.
31 The domination analysis bears some similarities to Amartya Sen's and Martha Nussbaum's capability 
approach, as it focuses on people's effective freedom and dignity – capabilities – to achieve lives they 
themselves value.
32 It is also worth bearing in mind that advances in science and humanity's collective knowledge might 
enable future generations to utilize some valuable resources, but which they lack due to shortsighted 
decisions in the past.
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Humanity is currently on course to breach many of these irreversible climate thresholds, 
after which the progress cannot be reversed. These irreversibles grossly restrict option 
values  of future people  (Shue 2015a). Thereby uncertainty about  the  preferences  of 
future  people  gives  us  a  pressing  reason  to  mitigate  climate  change  to  protect 
opportunities of posterity, as domination analysis suggests.
3.3.1. Objection: Over-generalization
The most  obvious objection against  the domination  analysis  would be how it  over-
generalizes  the  problem.  If  the  present  dominates  future  by  necessity  due  to  their 
superior temporal position, it is hardly useful to employ the concept of domination. That 
would be to say that every generation, including our ancestors are inescapably guilty of 
domination. However, this inescapability objection ignores how technological progress 
has exacerbated the power disparity between the present and the future. Aside from 
some  local  depletion  of  resources,  past  generations  have  not  possessed  power  to 
fundamentally dictate the lives of future generations.33 Even if harm occurred, it was 
limited and unknowingly inflicted. By contrast, the current generation knowingly wields 
power  to  harm  future  with  our  greenhouse  gas  emissions.  (Nolt  2011,  62-63.) 
Technological  developments  such as  fossil  fuels  have weakened the internal  checks 
restricting power of the present.34 The present is now capable of exploiting temporally 
diffuse goods to pass the buck to posterity. (Smith 2013, 228-229.) As the spatial and 
temporal  scope  of  our  actions  have  increased,  we  continue  to  rely  on  outdated 
Westphalian norms of governance. While it is impossible to completely eliminate the 
unequal power structure between generations due to the flow of time, it is feasible to 
make sure this relation is as harmless as possible. No amount of emission cuts curbs the 
threat  of  domination,  which  would  still  persist.  Only  structural  and  institutional 
solutions are reliable ways of constraining the power of the present. In other words, the 
33 I do not try to identify a specific threshold of power which be enough to constitute domination 
between generations. Regardless, it appears that humanity has recently breached such limit with 
industrialization and consumption of fossil fuels. Most strikingly, humans are capable of causing 
mass extinction of humanity and much of the accompanying life on earth. In fact, this is what is often 
meant by anthropocene – epoch where humans themselves now constitute an enormous geological 
force with long-term consequences for the environment. It is also widely accepted that domination is 
a question of degree (McCammon 2018, ch. 1). At the very least the current domination of posterity 
is significantly more widespread and severe than in the past.
34 Smith also plausibly argues that interests of present and future used to be more aligned historically. In 
pre-industrial times people relied on children to be their caregivers as they grew old. In other words, 
caring for the future also helped the present people themselves. This relationship has significantly 
decayed with economic development. (Smith 2013, 228-229.)
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superior power of the current generation has to be structured so it is non-arbitrary. Even 
if the present is inevitably more powerful than the posterity, nothing necessitates this 
power to be wielded arbitrarily. This can be achieved by constitutional orders and global 
governance measures that promote accountability, checks and safeguards on behalf of 
posterity. Therefore, our power over the future does not have to constitute domination. 
Institutional  reforms can restrict  power  of  the current  people  in  domains  where the 
temptation to buck-passing is evident and potentially detrimental to future generations. 
As the institutional power held by current generation lessens, so does the domination 
(Smith  2013,  244).  These  measures  –  which  range  from  ombudsmen  and  proxy 
representation to public deliberation35 – will be considered further in chapter 4.
The criticism of  over-generalization  can  also  be  wielded  against  the  autonomy and 
freedom of future generations. If protecting autonomy of the posterity is the highest 
priority, then should the current generation not postpone all decisions to their successors 
in order to maximize the options available? Governance would have to cease not to step 
on toes of future generations.  This would be an absurd and paradoxical  conclusion. 
However,  this  argument  is  overly  simplistic  as  it  ignores  how  omissions  are  also 
decisions, especially in the case of climate change, which has arisen precisely because 
of  humanity's  inaction.  Furthermore,  some  policy  choices  are  clearly  less  path-
dependent and restrictive on the future than others – think of renewable versus nuclear 
energy.  In  any  case,  this  criticism  is  not  potent  against  the  domination  approach. 
Domination analysis does not imply that posterity's option value ought to be maximized 
at all cost. Instead, it only maintains that the current generation has to institutionally 
constrain their power over the future to make it nonarbitrary. This is what it means to 
respect autonomy of posterity.
3.3.2. Objection: Neorepublicanism
Next  two  objections,  intentionality  and  capacity  to  interfere  are  derived  from  the 
influential  neorepublican  tradition,  which  sees  freedom  as  non-domination. 
35 Some might argue that proxy representation of future generations' interests arrogantly presupposes us 
to know their preferences. I do not think this is necessarily the case. The domination analysis merely 
promotes autonomy of posterity, without any commitments to certain material goods or ends. 
Posterity's interest only refers to their capacity to determine conditions of their own actions and live 
according to their conception of the good. Some policies, such as acute mitigation of climate change 
(rather than mere adaptation) are clearly conducive to this goal.
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Neorepublicans such as Philip Pettit  and Frank Lovett  tend to restrict  domination to 
inter-subjective  relationships.36 Both  the  capacity  for  interference  and  intentionality 
relate to what we take the power over others to mean. First, neorepublicans interpret the 
superior  power  over  others  as  a  capacity  to  interfere  in  their  actions.  While future 
generations’ options are heavily affected by their predecessors, it is not clear that they 
are subject to any potential interference by their ancestors. Temporal distance between 
generations means there is no possibility of direct coercion or manipulation of posterity,  
unlike in the typical case of slavery. A slave is continuously exposed to his master’s 
will at every turn of his life. In fact, neorepublicans think that domination is harmful 
precisely because of the continuous fear of possible interference which breeds anxiety, 
uncertainty and loss of dignity. But posterity’s choices are not exposed to our control or 
whims in the same way, as we have already passed away when they exist. Instead, each 
generation has to do most with the hand they have been dealt with. (Katz 2017, 303.) 
Even if our ancestors heavily impacted our lives with their decisions, there is nothing 
they could currently do to us. In other words, there is no capacity to potentially interfere 
in the ongoing sense meant by the neorepublicans. Therefore, present generation cannot 
subject  posterity  to domination  by potentially  interfering  with their  choices,  as  they 
possess  no  such  capacity.  (Beckman  2016,  294.)  Consequently,  the  neorepublicans 
conclude that intergenerational domination is not possible. The ongoing nature of the 
interference is of course a relevant difference between traditional and intergenerational 
domination.  But  how  else  should  we  describe  the  enormous  power  gap  between 
generations if not as domination? Surely the fact that we can effectively shape future 
circumstances and choices available to posterity is an exercise of power over them. If 
one is capable of altering the very conditions of another person's life beforehand, is the 
threat  of  ongoing  interference  relevant  for  it  to  count  as  domination?  More  than 
anything,  this  appears  to  be  an  argument  against  the  neorepublican  concept  of 
domination. The fact that the extent of the domination has already been determined does 
not diminish the superior power of the present which the future has been unilaterally 
subjected to. It is not clear why the imbalance of power would only count as domination 
when the subjugated are under constant threat of interference. In some sense the relation 
between present and posterity is even more profound as it affects the very preconditions 
36 Central idea of the freedom as non-domination is how even potential interference violates freedom, 
given that this interference is arbitrary. Inter-subjectivity means that those dominated cannot look 
their superior in the eye without feeling inferior or unequal. Pettit has proposed an eyeball test for 
domination: one has to be able to “look others in the eye without reason for the fear or deference that 
a power of interference might inspire” (Pettit 2012, 84). 
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of a person's life. It might not be domination of the same kind as with contemporaries, 
but it is domination nonetheless.
According to neorepublicans, not only should we be capable of interfering in actions of 
posterity,  but secondly,  this should be done intentionally.  Neorepublicans understand 
domination as a violation of freedom which requires the agent to act intentionally to 
worsen the conditions of another (Beckman 2016, 297). Therefore, they challenge the 
idea  of  climate  change  as  intergenerational  domination  on  the  basis  that  it  is 
unintentional.  As has been argued, climate  change is  an unintended consequence of 
aggregate  emissions  of  various  actors.  While  climate  change  undoubtedly  restricts 
options of future generations, it is a mere side-effect of the current generation getting on 
with their lives. Hence, we are not purposefully subjecting posterity to our will by our 
emissions.  Neorepublicans  would  maintain  that  while  climate  change  reduces  the 
freedom of posterity, it nevertheless does not violate it. As a result climate change does 
not subject future generations to domination.  However, it  is not clear as to why one 
would restrict power over others to only mean intentional control of their choices. It is 
not  even  apparent  that  this  holds  in  many  traditional  cases  of  domination,  such  as 
serfdom. It is hardly the case that the landlords sought to specifically subjugate their 
serfs. Rather, similarly to climate change the issue arises from social structures which 
are tied to our everyday life. The inter-subjectivity of domination only holds in the most 
direct slave-master relations. John Nolt distinguishes between domination motivated by 
antipathy toward the dominated  and domination  motivated  by self-interest  or  greed. 
While the former derives pleasure from intentionally oppressing those dominated, the 
latter only seeks to elevate the dominator himself. (Nolt 2011, 63.) There is no reason to 
only  limit  domination  to  the  handful  of  situations  where  it  is  explicitly  intentional, 
rather than a by-product of large social structures.
The  restrictive  view  of  power  over  others  as  intentional  and  ongoing  threat  of 
interference is especially misguided because it hampers our ability to see the structural 
aspect of domination. For example, Pettit has asserted that interpersonal restrictions on a 
person's  freedom are  “more  serious  than  the  impersonal  restrictions  that  arise  non-
intentionally from the natural  order  or from the way things are socially  organized.” 
(Pettit  2001,  132).  But  unlike  a  volcanic  eruption,  arbitrary  power  gaps  between 
generations  are  not  mere  natural  or  accidental  obstacles  to  freedom.  Rather, 
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intergenerational  power  asymmetries  are  directly  affected  by  our  negligence  of  the 
future. As such they can be institutionally restricted and remedied to be less arbitrary. 
The danger is that by not conceptualizing this relation as domination we ignore it as a 
normal and unproblematic. Underestimating the threat structural and impersonal factors 
pose to freedom is especially worrisome, because according to Pettit domination is the 
one and only political  value and yardstick by which to judge our institutions  (Pettit 
1997, 80). To regard the power disparity between present and posterity as a natural 
occurrence which does not warrant action is to close our eyes from an enormous threat 
to  freedom.  The  problem  lies  precisely  in  the  elusive  structures  which  reproduce 
arbitrary power asymmetries  between generations.  Intergenerational  domination does 
not rest on deliberate repression but on structural negligence of the future which can be 
mitigated by institutional restrictions on the power of the present. The neorepublican 
account of intentional domination is thereby overly limited in scope. In fact, it has been 
criticized for disregarding how indirect,  structural discrimination such as racism and 
sexism violates freedom. To think that obstacles to freedom result either from natural 
forces or intentional decisions is a false dichotomy.  (Krause 2013, 191.) Unchecked 
power structures and unintended consequences can also threaten to violate freedom of 
vulnerable people (Schuppert 2015, 449). In a similar vein, Michael J. Thompson has 
argued that by focusing on interpersonal interference the neorepublican view misses the 
larger, systemic nature of domination. Unlike the 17th and 18th century politics, modern 
domination is defined by systemic forms of subordination and control. Institutionalized 
domination  normalizes  inequalities  in  political  influence  and  leads  to  corruptive 
concentrations of social power. (Thompson 2013.) Due to these shortcomings Fabian 
Schuppert redefines domination as follows (paraphrased):
“Domination occurs if either an agent A (which can be an individual, a group or 
an institution) has the power to intentionally arbitrarily interfere with an agent B 
OR if  agent  A's  actions  and  practices  structurally  disadvantage  (i.e.,  over  a 
longer period of time through an identifiable mechanism) agent B with regard to 
her  status  as  a  free  and  equal  person,  without  due  concern  for  her  relevant 
fundamental interests.” (Schuppert 2015, 450).
This extended conception of domination is easily applicable to intergenerational cases 
such as climate change. The present generation structurally disadvantages and hampers 
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choices  of  future  people  by  the  mechanism  of  greenhouse  gas  emissions,  hence 
undermining their autonomy and freedom. This also fits with Thompson's analysis: as 
domination becomes ingrained in institutions, it can lead to erosion of subject's moral 
autonomy. Power over others does not merely mean interfering in the subject's choices, 
but  a  more  fundamental  capacity  to  shape  their  will  and  legitimate  unequal  power 
relations  to  benefit  the  few.  (Thompson  2013,  295.)  Current  generation  molds  the 
conditions of posterity's life and choices without due concern for their autonomy. This 
power  disparity  is  legitimated  and  reproduced  by  our  institutions,  which  are  only 
accountable to current generation. A relation of domination can clearly reign over large 
spatial and temporal distances, even if the neorepublican conception struggles to make 
sense this.
Neorepublicans'  dismissive  stance  on structural  domination  is  peculiar  because  they 
stress  the  structure  of  domination  instead  of  its  outcome:  unequal  power  relations 
dominate even if the power is not exercised. If what matters is capacity to potentially 
affect others, a similar relation exists between generations. Even if there is no ongoing 
threat of interference, each generation possesses potential to subjugate posterity if no 
institutional checks are in place.  This relation is central  because every generation is 
vulnerable to  the ultimate power of their  predecessors.  This does not  mean that the 
injustice is derived from the fear of exploitation but rather from the fact that structures 
of unequal power are left in place to deny autonomy of future generations. Domination 
of posterity does not stem from the harm caused to defenseless people, but from the lack 
of institutional constraints against the superior power held by present. That is to say, the 
main  issue in the  arbitrary power relation  which remains  unabated,  not  the isolated 
harmful  outcome.37 The latter  is  only a symptom of the former.  While  this  unequal 
power does not place the posterity under a threat of an ongoing interference, it leaves 
them potentially vulnerable to undue influence on their lives. This loss of autonomy is 
made worse by the fact that  the present is likely to abuse this  power and harm the 
posterity  by engaging in  intergenerational  buck-passing.  It  is  worth  noting  that  this 
broader notion of domination does not rely on actual interference but on the potentiality 
of it. Posterity’s position is saliently inferior to present and warrants a right to complain,  
even if no actual interference occurs. In fact, ignoring the potential abuse of arbitrary 
37 Domination can also be conceptualized merely in the outcome-oriented sense, but I do not think this 
gives proper attention to the structural power disparities which violate posterity's freedom.
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power leaves all of posterity vulnerable to whims of the present. The challenge is then 
to  design political  institutions  which promote  accountability  and restrict  exercise  of 
arbitrary power.
Neorepublicans argue that a relation of domination itself harms the subject, and that this 
is implausible in intergenerational cases, where no interaction is possible. Yet even if 
the relation does not  harm the posterity directly,  it  can fail  to  respect  their  right to 
autonomy. (Katz 2017, 305.) The relation of domination between generations is morally 
significant, even if no harm is caused – it violates posterity’s autonomy. A similar point 
is made by Rahul Kumar (2018), who argues that it is the imposition of risk, not the 
actual  harm  that  wrongs  future  generations.  Given  the  power  disparity  between 
generations and human near-sightedness, posterity's  lives are put at considerable risk 
and thereby wronged. Adopting a risky policy wrongs future people by failing to respect 
their  autonomy  and  interests. If  a  relation  of  domination  can  wrong  the  subject 
deontologically  without  making  her  worse-off,  then  it  is  irrelevant  whether  the 
dominator could potentially interfere with the subject. Therefore, it would be a mistake 
to try to reduce the immorality of domination to purely inter-personal harms such as 
uncertainty  or  anxiety  that  require  possibility  of  on-going  interaction.  Pettit’s  and 
Lovett’s insistence that relation of domination itself lessens a person’s freedom requires 
continuous subjection to will of another agent. As there is no possibility of interaction 
or subjugation to fear between generations, neorepublicans are forced to conclude that 
the current generation’s exercise of superior arbitrary power over the future people is 
unproblematic.  (Katz 2017, 305-306.)  For them, the posterity’s  loss of freedom is a 
natural occurrence which does not have to be amended.  Reductio ad absurdum,  this 
suggests  the  neorepublican  view  is  incapable  of  adequately  addressing  domination 
between generations. If a theory is unable to see the vast, unabated power gap between 
generations as a violation of future people's freedom, then it is a shortcoming of the said 
account. The problem lies in the limited neorepublican concept of domination itself, 
rather than in its intergenerational interpretation. As the spatial and temporal reach of 
domination increases,  the neorepublican theory of domination becomes less and less 
feasible.  A  more  comprehensive  notion  of  domination  is  needed  to  account  for  its 
intergenerational dimension, which is ever more present with the increased consumption 
of temporally diffuse goods. Following Katz (2017, 306), I argue that if  the current 
generation’s superior and arbitrary power over posterity is not subject to appropriate 
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institutional  restrictions,  they  wrong  the  posterity  by  denying  their  autonomy  and 
thereby dominate them.
In sum, given the arbitrary, unilateral relationship between the powerful present and the 
vulnerable  future,  this  relation  is  best  conceived  as  domination.  Domination  better 
captures  the  notable  lack  of  cooperation  or  reciprocity  between  generations  in 
comparison to collective action problem analysis. In contrast to cooperation, domination 
approach is suitable even when parties no longer interact with each other. (Smith 2013, 
236.) It forces us to focus on the abuse of arbitrary power between generations. Given 
our  newfound  technological  power  to  shape  future  lives,  the  current  generation 
exercises  unilateral  power  over  a  dependent  posterity  with  barely  any  institutional 
constraints.  Climate  change  is  an  especially  pressing  example  of  domination  of 
posterity.  I  defended  a  relational  and  structural  conception  of  intergenerational 
domination,  irrespective  of  its  harmful  outcomes.  When  an  agent  is  in  position  to 
arbitrarily shape conditions of another agent's actions, the latter is dominated because 
this violates her autonomy. The classical neorepublican view was criticized for narrowly 
restricting domination to instances with an ongoing threat of intentional interference. 
Instead,  intergenerational  domination  is  significant  because  it  is  enmeshed  in 
institutions that violate posterity’s autonomy.  The present is in relation of domination 
with posterity as long as they refuse to place constraints  on their  own power to be 
sufficiently accountable to posterity.
3.4. Structural injustice and moral corruption
Analyzing climate change in terms of intergenerational domination helps us see why it 
is an instance of structural injustice, as is frequently argued. Structural injustices are 
collectively  produced  harms  through  institutions  and  social  practices  without  any 
specific  party  bearing  liability.  Iris-Marion  Young,  who  has  popularized  the  term, 
defines it in the following way:
“Structural  injustice,  then,  exists  when  social  processes  put  large  groups  of 
persons under systematic threat of domination or deprivation of the means to 
develop  and  exercise  their  capacities,  at  the  same  time  that  these  processes 
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enable  others  to  dominate  or  to  have  a  wide  range  of  opportunities  for 
developing and exercising capacities available to them.” (Young 2011, 52).
As discussed in the previous section, this is exactly the kind of injustice that occurs 
between  generations  in  global  climate  change.  Current  generation  undermines 
posterity's autonomy and capabilities by imposing costs of fossil fuel consumption on 
them.  The  institutional  processes  that  consolidate  this  relation  enable  the  current 
generation  to  dominate  and  elevate  their  own  abilities  by  exploiting  the  future. 
Simultaneously  future  generation's  range  of  opportunities  for  exercising  their 
capabilities  are  increasingly  diminished.  Young  (1990,  32)  sees  domination  as  a 
structural  phenomenon,  because  people  are  often  coerced  by  the  unintended 
consequences  of  actions  of  many  people.  Domination  refers  to  the  institutional 
conditions which preclude people from determining the conditions of their actions. If 
social  institutions  enable  other  people  to  determine  the  conditions  of  one's  actions 
without reciprocation, a person lives within structures of domination. (Young 1990, 38.) 
Structural injustice is not caused by intentional individual action, but by uncoordinated 
group behavior, which is tied to unquestioned institutional norms. The lack of direct 
causal agency means that the injustice is embedded in background conditions, making it 
difficult to recognize (Parekh 2010, 677). Domination of posterity is sustained by the 
billions  of  people  acting  habitually  within  our  institutional  framework.  This  is 
reinforced by the human bias towards the near future and local in-group members along 
with general scope insensitivity.
The inconspicuous nature of structural injustice also makes humanity more susceptible 
to  what  Gardiner  calls  moral  corruption. Due to  our  superior  temporal  position the 
current generation is likely to fall to the temptation of passing the buck to the least well-
off,  future  people  and  nature.  Each  generation  of  course  attempts  to  justify  their 
behavior, and in doing so succumbs to moral corruption. We disguise and distort the 
real,  morally  uncomfortable  tragedy  that  we  are  contributing  to.  This  is  done  by 
deceptive language and arguments which conceal the immoral nature of our actions. 
Applying our attention selectively,  we draw attention away from posterity's suffering 
and cast ourselves as the victims. In the case of climate change discourse this has meant 
excessive  focus  on  the  concerns  of  the  present  and  short-term economic  sacrifices, 
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leading to continuous procrastination and delays.38 Corruptive discourse licenses each 
generation’s  buck-passing  and  makes  inaction  excusable.  Recognizing  one's  moral 
failures is especially hard in the public sphere and it is therefore no surprise that each 
generation  is  likely  to  be  attracted  to  such  comforting,  self-deceptive  thinking. 
(Gardiner  2011a,  301-302.)  Moral  corruption  is  further  facilitated  by  the  complex 
structural injustices which appear to be natural and unavoidable, with no-one at fault. 
The threat is that such thinking becomes subconsciously internalized through society, 
corrupting the political system. One instance of moral corruption might even be how 
climate  change  is  commonly  thought  of  as  global  coordination  problem,  thereby 
concealing  the  uncomfortable  thought  of  intergenerational  domination.39 Moral 
corruption  is  especially  worrisome  because  of  the  enormous  power  asymmetries 
present: most the victims lack ability to resist or even make themselves heard as they 
are yet to exist (Gardiner 2011a, 302). Corruption and domination is particularly likely 
to manifest itself when there is no sense of accountability. “Power tends to corrupt, and 
absolute  power  corrupts  absolutely”  as  written  by  John Dalberg-Acton  (1887).  The 
complete lack of accountability and responsibility practically invites present generation 
to indulge in moral corruption.
As seen above, structural injustices overwhelm our concept of responsibility.  Young 
formulates social connection model of responsibility as a solution to this. She contrasts 
this  with  the  standard  liability  model  that  fails  to  assign  responsibility  for  global,  
structural injustices since it relies on direct interaction between a single perpetrator and 
a victim, but no such easily identifiable causal relation is present in structural injustices. 
The  social  connection  model  revises  this  by  asserting  that  anyone  whose  actions 
contribute  to  the  structural  processes  producing  an  injustice  are  responsible  for  it 
(Young 2006, 119). Responsibility therefore arises from structural social processes that 
connect  people.  The  social  connection  model  differs  from  traditional  individual 
responsibility  in  five  ways.  First,  it  does  not  isolate  or  blame  individuals,  because 
structural harms are result of the institutional system. Second, it takes into consideration 
that  the  background  conditions  of  an  action  are  often  unjust.  Third,  it  is  forward-
38 Furthermore, claims of prior entitlements, excessive burdens, budget constraints and reciprocity are 
routinely employed against climate action (Gardiner 2011a, 337).
39 Rather than reliably representing interest of future citizens, it seems that governments continuously 
succumb to short-term concerns of the present. The global analysis disguises this by failing to 
recognize the tyranny of the contemporary. (Gardiner 2017a, 26-27.) This obscure the fact that 
current generation is dominating posterity by arbitrarily shaping the conditions of their actions.
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looking.  This  means  that  the  social  connection  model  focuses  on  preventing  future 
injustices,  which often means reforming institutions.  The mission is not to blame or 
punish  the  perpetrators  but  rather  to  push  for  collective  action  to  facilitate  change. 
Fourth, the responsibility is shared between large groups of people who all contribute to 
the unjust social processes. Fifth, it can only be discharged through collective action and 
cooperation. (Young 2006, 119–123.)
According to Young, the social connection model falls into the category of political 
responsibility:  responsibility  to  organize  and  coordinate  collective  action  to  amend 
unjust structures. Such cooperation is based on public communication and persuading 
others to take action.  (Young 2006, 123.)  Furthermore,  the social  connection  model 
enjoys  a  motivational  advantage  over  the liability  model:  blame is  likely to  lead  to 
resentment, defensive reactions and shifting responsibility as others are also culpable in 
structural  injustices.  Such  blame-shifting  and  finger  pointing  is  not  conducive  to 
mobilizing cooperation for institutional reform (Young 2006, 124). Indeed, international 
climate negotiations demonstrate the recurring failure of the blame game. In contrast, 
the social connection model allows us to share the responsibility for structural injustices 
together, rather than holding certain individuals blameworthy.  It is also important to 
note  that  shared  responsibility  does  not  amount  to  equal  responsibility.  Agent's 
capability to influence the processes that produce the injustice determines her degree of 
responsibility. The responsibility differs based on agent’s power, privilege, interest, and 
collective ability in relation to the unjust structures (Young 2006, 127).
When applied to intergenerational domination, social connection model implies that we 
are responsible for contributing to social processes that dominate future generations. Do 
we by our  actions  contribute  to  structural  processes  that  limit  the options  of  future 
people  by  placing  them  in  vulnerable  position?  When  one  reflects  on  the  harmful 
consequences of climate change and the institutionalized short-termism, the answer is a 
resounding  yes.  Young's  portrayal  of  this  responsibility  also  appears  correct.  No 
individual  is  at  fault,  as  intergenerational  domination  is  clearly  a  structural  issue 
stemming from short-sighted institutions. Furthermore, such responsibility ought to be 
forward-looking, aimed at preventing future injustices. Given that climate change and 
domination predominantly threaten future generations, it is central that our concept of 
responsibility tracks our ability to remedy such harms and stop them from occurring in 
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the future. What matters is repairing the dominating relationship. The responsibility for 
climate  change  is  also  collectively  held,  because  it  is  not  caused  nor  solved  by 
individual  action.  Objective  of  such  responsibility  is  to  create  lasting  political  and 
institutional change, and therefore the responsibility is political in nature. Combating 
structural injustice is done by establishing and reforming institutions where they fail us. 
Neither should the climate responsibility be restricted by arbitrary spatial or temporal 
barriers as structural factors connect people to injustices irrespective of current state 
boundaries.  Such forward-looking collective  responsibility  is  a  form global  political 
responsibility  which  aims  at  effective  institutional  measures  to  safeguard  the 
environment and future generations. Further inquiries regarding how to distribute this 
responsibility between different actors fall outside the scope of this thesis. I would also 
add that the above discussion of responsibility is not integral to my overall argument, 
but merely supplements it. Nonetheless, it serves as an example of the kind of reformed 
notion  of  responsibility  that  domination  approach calls  for  in  order  to  better  tackle 
structural, long-term global challenges.
In this  chapter  I  hope to  have shown that  the traditional  way of  describing  climate 
change as a global coordination problem overlooks more fundamental issue: domination 
of  future  generations.  Resulting  from  the  uncoordinated  emissions  of  the  present 
generation, climate change is a structural process that dominates posterity and makes 
them vulnerable  to  deprivation.  Intergenerational  domination  arises  as  a  particularly 
egregious  problem,  because  many  of  the  seemingly  innocuous  solutions  to  climate 
change, such as geoengineering, are likely to exacerbate the domination of posterity. 
Furthermore,  the  asymmetric  vulnerability  between  generations  combined  with  the 
structural nature of climate change makes the ground ripe for moral corruption. This is a 
form of self-deception, serving as a tool to shift the blame and obfuscate the problem. 
Such self-serving behavior is unfortunately not surprising given the human tendency to 
succumb  to  short-termism.  But  the  social  processes  we  partake  in  are  neither 
unavoidable nor natural,  and can be remedied to lessen the domination.  The  current 
generation contributes by their  actions to the conditions of domination and therefore 
have  a  forward-looking  political  responsibility  to  establish  institutional  measures  to 
curb the tyranny of the contemporary. By disregarding future in decision-making and 
continuing  excessive  greenhouse  gas  emissions  we  undermine  future  peoples' 
opportunity to  live  a  life  according to  their  conception  of  the  good.  As we have a 
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responsibility not to contribute to the structural processes that lead to domination of 
future generations,  we ought  to  elevate  standing of  posterity  and limit  the  arbitrary 
power of the present. This calls for institutional representation of future generations and 
their  interests  in  decision-making.  This  is  essential  for  restoring  accountability  and 
adequately respecting posterity's autonomy. However, one also has to bear in mind that 
political  institutions are not created in a vacuum. They reflect  attributes of common 
sense morality and its corruption.  It is crucial to account for the human nature when 
assessing  what  kind  of  institutional  reforms  should  be  enacted  to  safeguard  future 
generations.
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4. Institutions for the future
Taking climate change and intergenerational domination seriously means tackling the 
power disparity between generations.  Most  often,  this  is  taken to  mean institutional 
constraints  on the power each generation holds over their descendants.  What should 
these institutions then look like? There are two general ways of resolving relation of 
domination as Pettit (1997, 67) has argued. First, one can seek to equalize the power 
between agents, either by increasing the capabilities of the oppressed or by decreasing 
the  power  of  the  dominator.  Unfortunately,  this  appears  unfeasible  in  the 
intergenerational  sphere,  because of the superior temporal  position the present holds 
over the future. The asymmetry of power based on laws of nature cannot be overcome. 
The second option is to structure the power relation to be non-arbitrary.  This means 
establishing a constitutional authority that provides checks and balances, accountability 
and means of contestation. Yet it is unclear how future generations could possibly hold 
current decision-makers accountable for their decisions. By definition non-overlapping 
generations  cannot  interact  or  hold  each  other  accountable.  Common  constitutional 
order cannot be enforced if the posterity is unable to contest decisions of the present. 
(Smith  2013,  237-238.)   However,  to  conclude  that  intergenerational  domination  is 
unavoidable  would be a  mistake.  The accountability  can be ensured by establishing 
institutional  representation  for  future  generations.  Posterity's  interests  can  be 
represented,  and  short-sighted  policies  contested,  even  if  the  future  individuals 
themselves are unable to participate. Consequently, no personal contestation is needed 
(Smith 2013, 242).40 Representative institutions function as external check on the power 
of current people and make the intergenerational relation less arbitrary.
Domination  is  an  institutional  failure  –  it  occurs  when  we  fail  to  place  external 
constraints and checks on arbitrary power structures (Smith 2012, 49). Intergenerational 
domination  is  not  only  restricted  to  climate  change  but  is  widespread  throughout 
political institutions. Current democracies are prone to succumbing into presentism – a 
bias in the decision-making in favor of the present generation (Thompson 2010, 17). 
This partiality toward the present is strengthened by the fact that the democratic process 
itself  amplifies  citizens'  tendency  to  discount  the  future.  Simultaneously,  current 
40 The same kind of indirect representation occurs between children and parents, who represent interest 
of their offspring.
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policies are increasingly having ramifications for the far future. In essence, those who 
are most adversely affected by certain laws do not have a voice in their creation. As 
climate change has showcased, short-termism is a continuous threat within democratic 
decision-making.  To counteract  domination  between  generations,  constraints  against 
unregulated power of current generation have to be institutionally introduced. Measures 
against supremacy of current generation do not violate their freedom, but instead are 
necessary  to  protect  autonomy  of  each  generation.41 Given  human  biases  and 
uncertainty regarding posterity's  values,  I  propose the answer lies in constitutionally 
ensuring deliberative methods of representation for future generations.
Institutions that attempt to represent the interests of future generations can be divided 
into  three  forms:  executive,  legislative  and  judicial.  The  executive  reforms  refer  to 
ombudsmen, trustees, guardians, and councils for future generations. They promote and 
introduce interests of future generations into political discussion by raising awareness of 
how our decisions affect them. Government bodies are answerable to ombudsman, who 
monitor and evaluate policies on the basis of how they impact posterity. Trustees can 
launch investigations on the basis of citizen complaints. This might also involve Future 
Councils  that  are  authorized  to  initiate  legislative  proposals  or  referendums.  Actual 
examples include  Hungarian Ombudsman for Future Generations since 2008 and the 
Knesset Commission for Future from 2001 to 2006. Both of these institutions had a 
broad mandate to review, suspend, and introduce future-oriented legislation,  but this 
was also their downfall: they were abolished or downgraded because they were seen as 
political  threats.42 Legislative reforms refer to changes in parliamentary and electoral 
systems. For example, Andrew Dobson (1996) and Kristian Ekeli (2005) have argued 
that  legislative  bodies  should  include  proxy  representatives  for  future  generations. 
Certain fraction of parliamentary seats would be reserved to these representatives, who 
have a special  mandate to represent the future. Other legislative means include sub-
majority rules: if a piece of legislation is expected to harm the posterity,  a specified 
minority  of  parliamentarians  could  suspend  it,  or  perhaps  initiate  referendum on  it 
(Ekeli 2009). Second chamber for future generations, equipped with veto powers could 
also achieve similar results. In practice the Finnish parliament has had a Committee for 
41 This can be thought of as a liberal ideal, a minimal way of ensuring each generation does not impose 
its values on its successors.
42 See Zwarthoed (2018) for different potential and existing institutional arrangements to represent 
posterity.
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the  Future  since  1993,  yet  its  role  is  restricted  to  research  and  communication 
concerning future trends. Finally, judicial institutions encompass constitutions, courts, 
and criminal law. Constitutional articles can assert the rights of future generations or 
institutions which safeguard the future. As with other reforms, these are often connected 
to preservation of natural resources and sustainability. One possible avenue would be a 
court for the future that could file indictments for crimes against posterity. Of course, 
many reforms, even the ones discussed here do not adhere to strict division between the 
three branches of government, but are cross-cutting. For example, compulsory future 
impact  assessment  would  predictably  cover  the  whole  political  decision-making 
process.  Furthermore,  the  reforms  presented  here  aim  to  formally  institutionalize 
representation of future generations  into policy-making:  NGOs and civil  society can 
also play important role in representation outside of this. (Rose 2016, 60-64.)
It should be noted that representation of posterity will be used here as a shorthand for 
representation  of  posterity's  interest.  This  essentially  means  speaking  and acting  on 
behalf  of  the  future  generations.  Only  tentative  and  non-concrete  proposals  for 
representing posterity will be provided here. The focus will be on deliberative proposals 
that  function  somewhere  in-between  substantial  future-focused  institutions  and 
instrumental changes that provide future benefits as a by-product.43 This is because non-
domination  simultaneously  requires  accountability  mechanisms only found in  robust 
institutional solutions as well as procedural value change. To what extent this requires 
specific  future  representatives,  establishment  of  new  institutions  or  other  practical 
questions are outside the realm of this chapter. While I will be focusing on reforms at 
the national level, representative mechanisms for posterity would eventually have to be 
introduced on the global scale as well.
4.1. Challenges to representation
There  is  a  tension  between  effectiveness  and  democratic  legitimacy  of  representing 
posterity. The stronger the representation of future generations, the more problematic it 
is  in  terms  of  legitimacy.   Less  powerful  advisory  bodies  are  unlikely  to  trample 
43 See González-Ricoy & Gosseries (2016) for distinction between future-focused and future-beneficial 
institutions. 
40
democratic rights of current people, but they are also weaker in safeguarding posterity. 
The  following  sections  will  focus  on  these  legitimacy  challenges,  namely 
accountability, generational sovereignty and practicality.
4.1.1. Accountability
Accountability concerns arise mostly because posterity can neither select nor validate 
their representatives. The main difficulty of representation therefore relates to lack of 
authorization and accountability – if posterity's interest were to be misrepresented, they 
would be powerless to oppose it. Of course, this would not be a problem if posterity’s 
interests were widely known, but uncertainty regarding these preferences is precisely 
the  problem.  Epistemic  issues  regarding  the  plurality  of  values  held  by  posterity 
diminishes legitimacy of their representation. While we can be confident in knowing the 
basic  needs  of  future  generations,  such  as  food  and  housing,  their  fundamental 
conceptions of the good remain elusive to us. Even protecting a general interest like 
autonomy might require us to know something about the kind of preferences posterity 
could potentially hold (Karnein 2016, 87). Otherwise we are likely to remain unsure of 
how to best support their autonomy in practice. Identifying objective interests is also 
complicated by the fact that the current generation unavoidably shapes and affects the 
values  posterity  comes  to  accept.  Furthermore,  there  is  likely  to  be  considerable 
plurality of values, within and across different future generations. Even in the case of 
climate change, basic interests of different future generations might come into conflict. 
Problems  of  uncertainty  are  also  exacerbated  by  the  difficulty  of  predicting  far-off 
consequences  of  our  actions.  Finally,  insincere  and  perverted  representation  of 
posterity’s  interests  also  remains  a  worry,  as  present  people  are  not  authorized  by 
posterity to represent them. (Karnein 2016, 85-87.) This is especially so given the ever-
present threat of moral corruption.
These challenges do not make representation of posterity impossible though. Rather, a 
theory of representation has to be sensitive to the issues raised above. Namely, surrogate 
representation of future generations remains a plausible option, which means acting for 
the interests of people outside the representative's constituency. Since posterity cannot 
communicate their consent, one ought to assess how these representative institutions are 
established in the first place. This includes both the principles that guide representative's 
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decisions  and  the  procedural  mechanisms  which  dictate  how  these  principles  are 
applied. (Karnein 2016, 93.) I propose the main principle that should guide our actions 
is the respect for posterity's autonomy. While future generations' objective interests are 
hard to define, we can certainly know that each generation has interest in deciding the 
course of their own lives. Even the posterity is likely to have intrinsic need to dictate 
conditions of their own actions. That future generations want to have a say over the laws 
that bound them is hardly a radical assumption, and rather innate to humanity. Respect 
for autonomy makes it possible for people to pursue their own conception of the good 
and act in accordance with their objective interests. In practice, we only have to know 
which policies are especially path-dependent and thereby likely to significantly reduce 
autonomy  and  options  of  future  generations.  Posterity  would  hardly  agree  to  be 
subjugated  by catastrophic  climate  policies  of  their  predecessors.  In  the  same vein, 
Dennis F. Thompson argues that the present can represent future by acting as trustees of 
the democratic process. The current generation should protect popular sovereignty and 
democracy over time. Even if we do not know the exact preferences or needs of future 
generations, we can preserve their right to make those choices collectively. (Thompson 
2005, 248-249.) 
One  way  to  frame  this  is  as  contractualist  account,  where  our  actions  have  to  be 
justifiable to all future generations. Respecting posterity's autonomy means considering 
what policies they could not reasonably reject.  In other words, this means weighing 
what would be acceptable to future people,  so not to violate their decisional agency 
(Johnson 2007, 82). The contractualist view also helps explain why the non-existence of 
posterity  is  not  a  problem  for  accountability.44 It  is  widely  recognized  that 
contractualism does not place emphasis on the actual consent, but on reasonableness of 
the  terms  proposed.  The  fact  that  future  generations  cannot  presently  consent  is 
therefore a non-issue. The main contribution of contractualism is that it compels us to 
scrutinize the reasons for our decisions. (Beckman 2008, 616-618.) Similarly, Karnein 
suggests a standard of equal respect between generations. According to her, the essential 
point is that the current representatives have to justify their decisions to posterity as if 
they were present today. The current generation is then discursively accountable to the 
future. Placing one's own frivolous interests above their descendants' survival is hardly 
44 Furthermore, contractualism alleviates the classic non-identity problem. Posterity is justified in 
blaming us because of our failure to show due concern for their interests. Whether the harms 
actualize in the future is irrelevant as putting posterity at risk already wrongs them. (Kumar 2018.)
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justified compatible with such respect. This duty does not require one to know future 
generations' preferences and is therefore free of substantive value assumptions. (Karnein 
2016, 93.) Accordingly, accountability to posterity is best seen as public reason-giving, 
as  way of  justifying  ourselves  to  the  future.  As will  be  seen,  deliberative  forms  of 
representing the future are just this.
In contrast to Thompson (2005; 2010), I argue that one cannot exclusively focus on the 
preservation of democracy, but also on environmental constraints that violate liberty of 
posterity.  Climate change will  put enormous pressures on democratic systems in the 
form  of  refugees,  food  shortages,  heat  waves  and  societal  instability.  It  would  be 
disingenuous to defend climate inaction on the basis of wanting to leave these choices 
for  the  future  generations,  without  considering  how  such  inaction  threatens  the 
autonomy of these same future civilizations.45 Only by considering these factors can we 
gain  a  more  comprehensive  view of  intergenerational  domination.  All  in  all,  these 
viewpoints highlight the importance of representing posterity in decision-making. By 
respecting each generation’s autonomy,  it is possible to represent the future in a fair 
manner, without imposing our values on them. Rather than advancing specific alleged 
interests of posterity, the current generation ought to protect future generations’ capacity 
to make those choices for themselves. In other words, the representation is limited to the 
protection of posterity’s autonomy.46
4.1.2. Generational sovereignty
Representation  of  future  generations,  especially  if  constitutionally  entrenched,  can 
threaten democratic sovereignty of generations. First off, any representation of posterity 
is  predictably  going  to  place  constraints  on  the  democratic  powers  of  the  present 
generation. What  is  more,  constitutionally  entrenched  representation  of  future 
generations  might  actually  hurt  their  freedom.  The  argument  is  that  democratic 
constraints introduced today are likely to remain in force long into the future, thereby 
45 Not to mention how such an argument leads to a rabbit hole of inaction, where no generation could 
possibly act.
46 Of course, there might be trade-offs with autonomy and other forms of well-being. I do not suggest 
that autonomy trumps all the other ethical considerations, but merely that other things being equal, 
one ought to choose the option that is less restrictive on posterity’s autonomy. In practice one might 
have to carefully weigh path-dependency and future well-being against each other, when considering 
a policy, while also being mindful of our limited knowledge concerning the future. The central point 
is that these decisions are justifiable to posterity in discursive terms.
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restricting posterity's options and denying them from determining their own lives. While 
future generations  may try to  change the  laws made by their  predecessors,  this  can 
prove to be difficult or even futile as many laws have irreversible effects. The damage is 
done as the precedent is set and the law becomes entrenched. (Thompson 2005, 247.) 
As  a  result,  current  generation's  self-imposed  restrictions  designed  to  empower  the 
posterity might  turn out to dominate them. Safeguards against  short-termism may in 
reality undermine autonomy of posterity, who have no say in their creation. This trade-
off is especially evident in environmental issues: strict constitutional measures might 
protect  the  environment  while  simultaneously  hurting  posterity’s  ability  to  govern 
themselves effectively. This is what Ludvig Beckman calls the “democratic problem of 
future generations”. (Beckman 2008, 613-614.) Institutional reforms should be careful 
not to violate generational sovereignty of each generation to govern themselves. Any 
representative model therefore has to walk a fine line between respecting autonomy of 
the present and the future.
Constitutions can be taken to be a necessary safeguard for the self-determination of both 
present  and future generations,  because of  the long-term stability  they provide over 
generations.  As  a  forward-looking  document,  it  establishes  fundamental  values  and 
rights  that  are  beyond  the  will  of  simple  majorities  (Gárdos–Orosz  2017,  595). 
Constitutionally mandated representation of future generations can preserve freedom by 
ensuring accountability and distribution of power between generations. Such ideas are 
not wholly new. Even the preamble of the United States Constitution claims to preserve 
liberty to present and future generations, while the constitutions of Japan and Norway 
actually grant posterity rights (Zwarthoed 2018, 95). Over the few last decades, nearly 
60 countries have adopted constitutional provisions which explicitly try to safeguard 
posterity (Gonzalez-Ricoy 2016, 170). Constitutions are justified precisely because of 
the benefits they create over time due to their immutable nature (Beckman 2008, 619). 
The fact that constitutions are immune to changes by simple majorities is essential to 
inclusive,  liberal  democracy.  Current  democracies  already  include  various  kinds 
constitutional protections for minorities to avoid tyranny of the majority, ranging from 
supermajorities requirements to minority rights. Constraints on legislative majorities are 
therefore not intrinsically undemocratic and can be justified by how they protect the 
democratic capabilities of future generations. As Thompson (2005, 255) has suggested, 
constitutional entrenchment is only objectionable if it constrains posterity in a particular 
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way.  Similarly,  Gárdos–Orosz (2017, 596) argues that as long future generations are 
able to challenge the constitution,  eternity clauses do not hinder their sovereignty or 
self-determination.
The above can be seen as a continuation of the liberal harm principle, which states that 
individual freedom can only be restricted in order to prevent harm to others.47 In other 
words,  individual  is  free  to  act  in  any  manner  as  long  this  does  not  violate 
corresponding  rights  of  other  people.  This  notion  is  directly  applicable  to 
intergenerational  relations.  Establishing  constitutional  restrictions  to  safeguard  the 
future is  a minimal way of ensuring each generation does not impose its will on their 
successors. Therefore, it is justified to limit the powers of the present people in order to 
ensure the autonomy of posterity. This does not amount to domination of posterity, or 
imposing our values on them, but the opposite: ensuring minimal protection for them. 
This  minimizes  the  extent  to  which  future  generations  are  exposed to  the  arbitrary 
power of the present people and holds people accountable for deviations from this. In 
conclusion, it  is  possible  to  improve  effective  generational  sovereignty  by  placing 
restrictions on the power wielded by the current generation, as noted by Alex Gosseries. 
While this restricts the jurisdictional sovereignty of each generation, it only does so to a 
limited degree, while simultaneously contributing to a more just distribution of effective 
generational sovereignty. (Gosseries 2016.) In other words, constitutions do not have to 
foreclose  legislative  options  as  much  as  they  increase  them  for  each  generation. 
Constitutional  provisions  therefore  do  not  have  to  be  a  source  of  intergenerational 
domination but can instead form an important safeguard against such domination.
In addition,  constitutions  alleviate  intergenerational  collective action problems.  As a 
mechanism of intergenerational communication, constitution can encourage cooperation 
across generations and investments into long-term projects (MacKenzie 2018, 262). By 
their nature constitutions incentivize every generation to comply and cooperate jointly 
under  common  rules.  Constitutional  clauses  make  commitments  more  likely  to  be 
honored over time and render them more resilient to electoral turnover (Gonzalez-Ricoy 
2016,  174).  They  strengthen  the  continuity  between  generations  and  lessens  the 
uncertainty, thereby creating a more robust political commitment to long-term policies. 
As the  constitution  promotes  cooperation  across  generations,  current  people  can act 
47 See Mill (1859) for classical description of the no-harm principle.
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knowing that their present sacrifices will not be in vain. Gonzalez-Ricoy also argues 
that clear constitutional provisions increase public perception and support of long-term 
policies.  Uncompromisable  constitutional  provisions  signal  importance  to  citizens, 
affecting their values and beliefs. (Gonzalez-Ricoy 2016, 177.) 
Constitutions are usually limited to decision-making procedures: they set the framework 
for accountability and render the use of power less arbitrary.  Given that domination 
arises because of the lack of accountability, constitutional provisions are an ideal tool to 
introduce answerability and justifiability to the system. In the case of posterity this can 
be  done  through  establishing  future  representation  and  deliberative  reason-giving. 
Under contractualist account the justifiability of constitutional restrictions comes down 
to whether future generations could be reasonably expected to support such constraints 
despite the costs to their own self-determination. The current generation has to establish 
institutions that consider posterity's interests in a way they could not reasonably reject 
(Beckman 2008, 616-619). Even if future generations were exclusively concerned about 
their  autonomy,  they  would  surely  care  how  climate  change  undermines  their 
democratic options.48 The distinction between formal and effective freedom is relevant 
here: the issue is not merely what the legislation allows but the actual options one has 
available  to  himself.  It  appears  feasible  that  future  generations  would  accept  some 
restrictions in their formal political freedoms to ensure climate change does not threaten 
their democratic choices. Generational sovereignty does not only extend to jurisdiction, 
but also to effective freedom to choose one’s path of action. Earth ravaged by climate 
change heavily shapes conditions of posterity’s actions, permanently foreclosing some 
options available to them.
The power of constitutions is derived from the fact that they have higher precedence and 
are more stringent  to  amend than ordinary law (Gonzalez-Ricoy 2016, 174).  At the 
same time, the threat constitutional rigidity poses to generational sovereignty is real. 
One might  initially  object  that  each generation possesses the ability  to  change their 
constitution and laws, and is thereby not tied by decisions of their ancestors. This is not 
quite right, as the question is precisely the legal cost of such changes (Beckman 2008, 
48 The claim that posterity only cares about maximation of democracy is a dubious claim in itself, see 
Beckman (2008). Posterity is also likely to appreciate environment, civic society, culture and 
numerous other things. However, this modest assumption focusing on autonomy and democracy is 
consistent with us not knowing the fundamental interests of future generations. 
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615). The point of constitutional constraints is that they increase the costs policymakers 
face if they disregard the future, thereby widening the time-horizon of politics. Indeed, 
it  should  be  costly  to  circumvent  rights  of  posterity  and  therefore  constitutional 
provisions ought to be judicially enforceable. They have to be rigid enough to actually 
limit  policy-making and be resilient  against  the  temptation  of  buck-passing.  On the 
other hand, constitutional rigidity might result in harmful or at least less than optimal 
outcomes  to  posterity  (Gonzalez-Ricoy 2016,  179).  The  clauses  have  to  be  flexible 
enough  to  adapt  to  unseen  consequences  and  interests  of  future  generations. 
Constitutional  measures  that  tackle  intergenerational  domination  still  ought  to  be 
amendable, in order not to succumb what they try to remedy (Beckman 2016, 13). We 
face a balancing act. These challenges can however be alleviated. Most constitutional 
entrenchments  usually  limit  themselves  to  procedural  requirements  (such  as 
deliberation),  rather  than  specific  policy  paths.  They  assert  general  principles  the 
decision-making has to adjust to, rather than tying the hands of posterity to particular 
practices. In related manner, constitutional provisions are often formulated abstractly, to 
better adjust to the evolving needs of future generations. While abstraction makes the 
clauses less enforceable, it makes it possible for courts to adjust their understanding to 
scientific and societal progress. Finally, the content of constitutional restrictions can be 
limited to issues which are the least uncertain,  like each generations interest  in self-
determination.  (Gonzalez-Ricoy 2016,  180.)  In  other  words,  constitutional  measures 
have to be modest in their scope, and not overly ambitious in what they try to legislate. 
This  is  reflected  in  the  focus  on  posterity’s  autonomy.  Constitutionally  entrenched 
deliberative institutions are consistent with each generations' right to self-determination, 
especially if they are directed at how to best protect autonomy of future generations.49
4.1.3. Practicality
Representation of future generations also faces practical challenges. Aside from being 
democratically legitimate across generations, future-oriented institutions ought to fulfill 
principles  of  effectiveness,  feasibility  and  sustainability.  Most  obviously, 
constitutionally  entrenched  representation  of  future  generations  actually  has  to  be 
49 The institutional focus is also important because, as Chilton and Versteeg (2016) have found, in 
contrast to individual rights, organizational rights embedded in constitutions tend to be more 
effective. This is because organizational rights establish institutions and resources to safeguard the 
underlying right, thereby making them self-reinforcing. Embedding long-term deliberative 
institutions in constitution could therefore increase their impact.
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effective in limiting intergenerational domination. As Simon Caney notes, this does not 
necessarily mean eliminating the problem altogether,  but making strides towards so. 
Effectiveness of a reform ought to be judged both in terms of how it would improve the 
status quo and how it compares to other possible measures. (Caney 2016, 140.) It is 
important to note that the goal is not just to render politics less short-termist,  but to 
actually curb the intergenerational domination. The distinction is central, because many 
of the proposals aimed at making politics more long-termist do not actually incorporate 
accountability  mechanisms,  which  are  crucial  in  tackling  domination.  Constitutional 
measures usually establish accountability frameworks, making deviations more costly. 
Political representation should also be sustainable over longer time periods and resistant 
to electoral shifts. This is obviously another criterion where constitutionally entrenched 
representation performs well. As noted earlier, constitutions can also be self-reinforcing 
by breeding long-term values in citizens. Finally,  representation should be politically 
feasible and achievable. If a proposal does not stand any chance of being implemented 
or  affecting  values  of  the  citizens,  resources  spent  endorsing  it  are  essentially  lost. 
(Caney 2016, 142.)
An  institutional  challenge  related  to  future  is  the  uncertainty  of  nation  states. 
Constitutions  as  we  know  them  are  restricted  to  specific  states  with  their  own 
jurisdiction, yet these states are constrained by boundaries and subject to change. This 
casts  doubts over the effectiveness  of constitutional  safeguards which are limited  to 
certain  states.  Global  institutions  which  would  encompass  these  constitutional 
provisions  appear  more  comprehensive  and  efficient,  although  also  less  feasible 
politically.  This  is  not  necessarily  a  far-fetched  idea:  The  Universal  Declaration  of 
Human Rights was passed in 1948. Similarly, some have recently called for the creation 
of United Nations' High Commissioner for Future Generations. Indeed, Aaron Maltais 
among others has argued that climate change creates  cosmopolitan duty to establish 
global institutions with extensive jurisdictional mandate. If one accepts that we ought to 
show at least some consideration for interest of future generations this implies a duty to 
engage in global political project to overcome collective action problems between states 
and generations. (Maltais 2008.) Duties of justice therefore cannot be limited to only 
those that currently live under the same coercive political system. Likewise, Thompson 
has argued that looking into the future, one cannot draw a sharp distinction between the 
claims  of  foreign  and future  citizens.  As  future  citizens  are  equally as  likely to  be 
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descendants of some other state, national boundaries lose their significance in long-term 
decisions.50 And because present boundaries will hardly matter in the future, they should 
not weigh significantly in our current decisions that affect the future either. (Thompson 
2010, 21.) The global governance aspect is also recognized by Gardiner (2014), who 
calls  for  a  global  constitutional  convention  that  is  explicitly  focused  on  future 
generations. However, I will not consider problems of global governance further here.
4.2. Deliberative representation
Any attempt to represent the interests of future generations in decision-making has to 
balance between democratic legitimacy and effectiveness. Given that policy proposals 
have to combine these two, often contradictory goals, I argue that the solution is to 
pursue deliberative forms of representation for posterity. This is not least because of the 
unavoidable uncertainty regarding the future and the biases of common sense morality. 
In  the  case  of  representing  posterity,  two  aspects  of  deliberation  are  especially 
important:  perspective-taking  and  public  reason-giving.  Perspective-taking  enables 
people to place themselves in others' shoes and to see the issue from the viewpoint of 
future generations. Indeed, perspective-taking and empathy are intimately connected to 
representation of those who are not present (Setälä 2019)51. Public reason-giving is used 
to  justify  one's  decisions  to  others,  central  for  the deliberative  accountability  to  the 
posterity. This entails careful deliberation about which principles the future generations 
could come to accept. Without extensive deliberation sustainable value transformation 
cannot  be  achieved  and  we  are  likely  to  misjudge  interests  of  future  generations. 
Deliberative democracy fulfills the legitimacy condition, while also possessing enough 
action-guiding  potential  to  effectively  safeguard  posterity.  All  in  all,  deliberative 
representation of future generations  may encapsulate  future people’s interests  in  our 
own preferences (Goodin 1996).
Deliberative  democracy highlights  the  importance  of  discussion and dialogue to  the 
political  process.  Political  decisions  should  be  a  result  of  reasonable  debate  and 
50 This is also assuming that current nation states and borders remain unchanged in the future – rather 
unlikely scenario.
51 I would like to thank Maija Setälä for sharing a manuscript of her unpublished paper ”The Politics of 
Non-Existence”, presented at ECPR General Conference, Wroclaw, September 2019.
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discussion  between  citizens.  Legitimacy  of  decision  is  therefore  not  based  in  mere 
aggregation  of  votes  but  in  inclusive,  quality  deliberation.  According to  theories  of 
deliberative democracy, the decision-making itself is a process which can breed greater 
value  alignment  and  consensus  on  policies  between  citizens.  The  mutual 
communication forces people to justify their positions by arguments that others could 
also  plausibly  accept.  This  discursive  process  illuminates  the  differing  values  and 
preferences of groups and helps them find common ground. Deliberation incorporates 
inclusive  and  diverse  groups  in  order  to  avoid  biased  discussion  and  harmful 
groupthink. (Fishkin 1995.) Public deliberation is said to change citizens' preferences 
and lead to more enlightened decisions. In practice, deliberative mini-publics such as 
Citizens’ Assemblies have led ordinary citizens to deliberate in good will and align their 
views with evidence (Dryzek et al. 2019). Mini-publics usually take place over multiple 
days,  and  consist  of  information  gathering,  expert  testimonies  and  small  group 
deliberation, facilitated by moderators. These democratic innovations use sortition, ie. 
random,  but  representative  selection  of  citizens  to  ensure  inclusion  of  different 
viewpoints.  Empirical  evidence  suggests  that  such  small-scale  deliberation  leads  to 
stronger support  for sustainable  and long-term policies.  For example,  Niemeyer  and 
Jennstål cite findings from Australian deliberative forums concerning climate adaption, 
which led to strong commitment to long-term climate action among the participants. 
The deliberation also made participants care about future generations in more concrete 
terms:  as  vulnerable  individuals  under  threat  rather  than  as  mere  abstract  entities. 
(Niemeyer  & Jennstål 2016, 254-256.) Similarly,  Ireland's recent Citizens'  Assembly 
nearly unanimously backed investments into clean energy, green infrastructure, public 
transportation as well as tax on greenhouse gas emissions to combat climate change 
(The Citizens' Assembly 2018, 5-6).
One of  the  tenets  of  deliberative  democracy is  the  so called  'all-affected  principle', 
according to which all parties whose interests are seriously affected by a decision ought 
to have a say in its making. In deliberative terms this means public reasoning in which 
everyone affected or their representatives have the right to participate in the decision-
making  process.  As  a  result,  democratic  decisions  that  significantly  affect  posterity 
cannot be considered legitimate unless they have been heard in the decision-making 
process (Ekeli 2005, 430.) Future generations should therefore be represented in policy 
decisions that significantly bear upon their  lives.  The all-affected principle  has been 
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criticized for over-inclusion and impracticality, especially if it is taken to  include all 
possibly affected future generations (Tannsjö 2007; Bovenkerk 2015).52 The problem of 
limitless  demos  can  be  countered  by requiring  decisions  to  be  merely  justifiable  to 
future generations that cannot participate through deliberation (Bovenkerk 2015, 503). 
It should be noted that what I have been arguing for is not as demanding as the all-
affected  principle.  The  problem  is  not  that  we  are  affecting  or  impacting  future 
generations, as this is inevitable. Rather, nowadays we are determining and preempting 
conditions  of  posterity's  actions,  thereby denying  their  decisional  agency.  The chief 
motivation  for  representation  of  future  generations  therefore  rests  on  curbing 
intergenerational domination, rather than on adhering to the all-affected principle.53 One 
does not have to explicitly subscribe to the all-affected principle, to still appreciate how 
the process of public deliberation instrumentally helps us toward more long-term and 
intergenerationally just policies.
Deliberative  democracy  can  figure  into  and  manifest  itself  in  the  representation  of 
posterity  in  multiple  ways.  As  already  suggested,  there  are  two  main  avenues  for 
advancing representation of future citizens: guardians like ombudsmen and reserving 
seats for parliamentary representatives.  Both of these can be used to increase public 
attention  and deliberation  about  posterity's  interests.  Ombudsmen  can give  voice  to 
politically marginalized groups and thereby influence political discourse. As Thompson 
(2010, 29) notes, assuming a role of future representative is a powerful motivator that 
changes  individual  behavior.  However,  as  a  single  institutional  authority,  whose 
mandate is focused on investigation and monitoring, ombudsman is unlikely to facilitate 
inclusive debate about posterity's interest. A single spokesperson does not represent the 
diversity  of  views  that  inclusive  deliberation  does.  The  same  applies  to  courts  and 
special  agencies  appointed  to  safeguard  posterity.  Of  course,  future  guardians  can 
nevertheless  be  useful  for  inciting  debate  about  the  posterity's  interests,  and should 
therefore not be disregarded, but seen as complementary to legislative reforms. A more 
natural  place  for  genuine  deliberation  to  occur  is  certainly  the  legislative  chamber. 
Indeed,  Kristian  Ekeli's  (2005) proposal  to  reserve  certain  number  of  parliamentary 
seats  to  future  representatives  has  strong  deliberative  element  to  it.  In  contrast  to 
52 Furthermore, there is the boundary problem, i.e. who decides whose interest are significantly 
affected. This decision cannot be made democratically by those affected since that would lead to 
infinite regression.
53 Intergenerational domination and the all-affected principle are admittedly closely connected to each 
other. More research on this relationship would be welcome.
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Dobson (1996),  who proposed environmental  lobby to  act  as  representative  for  the 
posterity  in  the  parliament,  Ekeli  argues  that  environmentalists  have  insufficiently 
narrow of a view of sustainability. The debate about posterity's specific interests should 
be left open, as only diverse set of perspectives can capture the plurality of values future 
generations  might  hold.  (Ekeli  2005,  435-437.)  Under  Ekeli's  proposal  future 
representatives would be democratically elected and each citizen would vote for two 
candidates: both future and present representative.54 Aside from regular law-making, a 
qualified majority of future representatives would also have a suspensive veto power to 
delay legislation  that  they deem harmful  to  the future generations.  Ekeli's  model  is 
based on ideals of deliberative democracy. By slowing down decisions, it fosters public 
awareness and debate about future issues. This aims to prevent excessively short-termist 
or self-interested proposals. Deliberation encourages citizens and representatives to put 
forward  impartial  arguments  that  are  acceptable  to  all  the  parties  involved. 
Representation  of  future  generations  may  thereby  foster  an  educative  process  that 
engenders citizens to internalize the needs of posterity in political decision-making. In 
the  end  the  interests  of  future  generations  become  more  imaginatively  present  to 
people.55 (Ekeli 2005, 440-441.)
The deliberative aspect of representation is perhaps strongest in mini-publics, which are 
composed  of  ordinary  citizens.  For  example,  Thompson  (2010,  30)  mentions  a 
specialized second chamber of randomly selected citizens, inspired after the Tribune of 
the Plebs in the Ancient Rome. The tribune did not participate in ordinary politics but 
stepped in to defend the rights and interests of the plebs when required. Independent 
from other political institutions, it was even capable of vetoing laws to safeguard the 
otherwise unrepresented plebs. MacKenzie (2016) also introduces a general purpose, 
randomly selected chamber of citizens as way to advance long-term decision-making. 
As an independent, broadly representative and deliberative body, it would be free of 
54 In order for traditional political parties or short-term interest groups not to abuse the system, the 
courts would have to regulate which candidates could qualify as legitimate representatives of 
posterity (Ekeli 2005, 438). The escalated power of courts is a valid criticism of Ekeli's model. 
Furthermore, as Jensen (2015, 548) notes, proxy representation can also involve unwanted costs to 
democratic ideals like equality.
55 Ekeli (2009) has also introduced sub-majority rules as one solution to the representation of posterity. 
Sub-majority devices specifically seek to counter the will of majority. A specially designated 
parliamentary minority could be given the authority to delay legislation or to trigger referendum 
when interests of future generations are overlooked. This has the benefit of avoiding a sharp 
distinction between the interests present and future people as well as the adjacent issues for 
democracy. However, sub-majority rules also face legitimacy challenges and are prone to abuse.
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political  incentives  that  breed  short-termism.  Instead  of  traditional  law-making,  the 
chamber would exercise influence by holding parliamentarians discursively accountable 
for  their  policies.  The  chamber  could  return  legislative  proposals  back  for  the 
parliament to reconsider, which the elected officials would then have to deliberate and 
justify  to  second  chamber  and  the  wider  public.56 (Mackenzie  2016,  291-292.) 
Furthermore,  Niemeyer  and Jennstål  call  for institutionalization of deliberative mini-
publics,  which  offer  discursive  representation  for  posterity.  Mini-publics  create  a 
deliberative space where the interests of future generations can be discursively present 
and felt. Broadly inclusive and representative group of citizens is more likely to capture 
the  diversity  of  perspectives  their  descendants  might  hold.  Carefully  designed  and 
implemented mini-publics can give face to the misfortune of posterity and transform 
them from abstract statistical victims to something more tangible. (Niemeyer & Jennstål 
2016,  251-253.)  The  direct  participation  of  citizens  also  increases  the  democratic 
legitimacy of the representation. Moreover, randomly selected and rotated citizens are 
exempt from pressures of short-term electoral cycles.  If a diverse assembly of people 
sincerely  imagines  and  deliberates  about  future  generations’  interests  within  an 
established institution, this is likely to mainstream its way to the public discussion. A 
citizens' assembly in which  a group of representatives deliberate how decisions affect 
autonomy and interests of posterity would be large step toward that direction. 
My goal  here  is  not  to  argue  for  specific  deliberative  institutions,  but  merely  offer 
examples of potential reforms to represent the interests of future generations. I leave it 
an open question exactly how much power these deliberative institutions should hold: 
whether their role is merely consultative or even includes veto-powers? Similarly, it is 
contentious  to  what  degree  these  institutions  should  rely  on  specific  future 
representatives  to  shape  deliberation.  The  specific  form  of  these  institutions  also 
depends on empirical findings. Rather than imposing certain institutional structures, it is 
most important that the procedural nature of deliberation is present in these reforms. 
Furthermore,  there  are  major  differences  between countries'  political  systems  which 
affect  how effective  these  representative  devices  are.  There  are  no one-size-fits-all-
models.  (Rose 2016, 65.) The main takeaway should be that deliberative reforms are 
especially  well  placed  to  address  many  of  the  issues  in  representation  of  future 
56 Admittedly the random chamber's effectiveness remains a worry, given the lack of veto powers. Its 
power is derived from the perceived legitimacy and credibility among the population (Mackenzie 
2016, 293).
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generations.  Public  deliberation  functions  as  check  on  power  of  the  present,  by 
effectively empowering the citizens  to act  as watchdog for posterity.  It  slows down 
decisions and exposes short-sighted reasoning, thereby limiting the power of myopic 
legislators  (Ekeli  2009,  456). Regardless  of  the  specific  reform  pursued,  they 
nevertheless ought to incorporate deliberative practices into them. Institutionalization of 
deliberation is important for directing the discussion towards the autonomy of posterity. 
I  will  now showcase the benefits  of deliberation and how it  alleviates  some central 
challenges of representing interests of future generations in decision-making. Namely, 
deliberation  leads  to  educative  perspective-taking,  long-termism,  discursive 
accountability, depolarization and relieves uncertainty about the future.
4.3. Benefits of deliberation
Educative perspective-taking
Deliberative institutions can raise awareness about the interests of future generations in 
an educational manner. This is essential, because as discussed earlier, intergenerational 
domination  is  to  a  large  degree  result  of  shortcomings  of  common  sense  morality. 
Human morality is focused on the short-term consequences of our individual actions to 
those spatially and temporally closest to us. In essence our moral circle and empathy is 
restricted to our immediate contemporaries.57 Implication of these human biases is that 
institutions  have  to  be  focused  on  education,  dialogue,  and  public  deliberation  to 
achieve sustainable value transformation within the population. As Caney (2016, 152) 
has noted, many of the institutional restrictions are downstream solutions, which are 
hard to enact legitimately without first affecting people's values and motivation in the 
upstream.58 Deliberation's strength lies in combining these two aspects.
Central  for  deliberation  is  perspective-taking,  a  process  where  people  learn  to 
understand others’ viewpoints, and in some sense are able to put themselves in positions 
of others. Perspective-taking can alleviate the empathy biases that also motivate short-
termism. Humans tend to empathize with their close in-group members at the cost of 
57 See back to chapter 1 of this thesis.
58 Another way to formulate this would be to make a distinction between supply (institutional 
restrictions) and demand (moral deliberation) solutions.
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distant out-groups. Deliberation can break these barriers and motivate consideration of 
interests  of  disadvantaged  out-groups,  such  as  future  generations.  (Setälä  2019.) 
Therefore,  deliberation  is  not  a  mere  representative  tool  but  educative  way  of 
incorporating future generations' interests in to the public sphere. Through discursive 
process citizens can come encapsulate and internalize interests of future generations. 
Affection, empathy and the subsequent motivation are all essential in safeguarding the 
future. Deliberative reasoning is of no use unless posterity is also emotionally present in 
the process. As the interests of future generations are incorporated to the deliberative 
setting, they are transformed from abstract or statistical  victims to actual beings that 
motivate  us  to  reconsider  our  actions.  Deliberation  aims  to  generate  empathy  for 
voiceless groups by making their interests salient during the dialogue. (Goodin 1996.)
Public deliberation helps citizens consider out-groups' interests by exposing them to a 
diverse  set  of  perspectives.  Empirical  studies  indicate  that  this  applies  even  if  the 
oppressed  group  itself  is  not  present  in  the  deliberation.  In  a  Finnish  experiment, 
deliberation  encouraged  participants  to  consider  interests  of  immigrants  despite  no 
immigrants  being  involved  in  the  process.  By  the  virtue  of  deliberation,  those 
empathetic towards immigrants acted as representatives for their viewpoints. (Grönlund, 
Herne & Setälä 2015.) There is no principled reason as to why the same mechanism 
could not  apply in  intergenerational  setting  and why deliberation  could  not  provide 
presence for posterity's interests.59 Of course, the non-existence as well as non-identity 
of posterity is a challenge even in deliberative setting. These more abstract, distant out-
groups might not incite empathy in the same way as groups that actually exist in the 
present.  But  as  discussed,  empirical  evidence  suggest  citizen  deliberation  generally 
leads  to  more  long-term and  sustainable  policies.  This  effect  can  be  reinforced  by 
framing and narrative tools that evoke emotional concern for posterity,  say by using 
young people as proxy representatives for interests of future generations (Setälä 2019).
Long-termism
Deliberation alleviates both affective and rational conditions that breed short-termism. 
While perspective-taking emotionally motivates us to consider the interests of future 
59 It is worth noting that future generations do not actually suffer from social prejudice the same way 
some existing out-groups do, say immigrants. Future generations are usually seen in positive light, as 
an extension of ourselves.
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generations,  deliberative  processes also breed more  far-sighted reasoning. Analytical 
deliberation can help us overcome the deeply rooted, intuitive cognitive biases which 
underlie our short-termism (MacKenzie 2018, 254). Under deliberation public decisions 
ought to be justified by reasons and arguments that everyone affected could plausibly 
accept.  Deliberative  institutions  therefore  promote  universal  positions  that  consider 
potential  interests  of  posterity.  (Ekeli  2009,  MacKenzie  2016.)  Given  that  careful 
weighing  of  the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  different  arguments  is  essential  to 
deliberation, claims that are integrate preferences of both current and future generations 
are more likely to find success. The fact that participants have to justify their views to 
others  through  public  reason-giving  and  critical  dialogue  helps  combat  biases. 
Accordingly,  findings indicate that participating in deliberation leads people to adopt 
more public-spirited positions (Ackerman & Fishkin 2004, 55). When intergenerational 
issues  are  recognized  in  the  deliberative  process,  self-serving  and  short-sighted 
arguments  can  be challenged  on those grounds (MacKenzie  2016,  287).  Arguments 
motivated by narrow self-interest lose their thrust in an environment where they have to 
be reasonably justified to everyone. While deliberation does not necessarily guarantee 
more long-termist outcomes, it is nevertheless advantageous for participants to rely on 
arguments that are consistent with the interests of the posterity. Gundersen (1995) finds 
that face-to-face dialogue on environmental issues can push people to adopt more long-
term perspectives. According to Fishkin (1995) participating in a deliberative poll in 
Texas led people to call for increasing renewable energy investments and conservation 
measures. Similar findings have also been reported globally by the World Wide Views 
on Global Warming project,  which organized deliberative mini-publics across thirty-
eight countries in 2009 (MacKenzie 2016, 287).
Given that deliberation induces people to consider future generations' interests in their 
arguments,  this might  actually lead participants  to internalize their  interests  (Goodin 
1996,  846).  Having  to  publicly  justify  one’s  position  leads  to  subconscious  self-
censorship  and  anticipatory  internalization  of  others'  interests  (Ekeli  2005,  446).  In 
other words, perspective-taking and reason-giving complement each other in improving 
impartiality  of  decisions.  This  is  crucial  because  deliberative  reasoning itself  is  not 
necessarily  sufficiently  directed  towards  the  long-term  interests  of  others.  It  also 
requires  the  right  environment  and incentives,  perhaps  facilitated  by specific  future 
representatives.  In  fact,  given how political  behavior  is  still  influenced by common 
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sense morality and its biases, affective responses might be the most important part of 
the puzzle.  Group identities  and emotional  reactions  often beat out carefully crafted 
arguments  in  political  decision-making.  However,  this  is  also  something  that 
deliberative institutions try to influence and change for the better.  Regardless of their 
respective importance,  both emotional and cognitive aspects of deliberation motivate 
people to safeguard future generations' interests.
Discursive accountability
Deliberative representation balances between the democratic rights of the present and 
the  future.  Given  that  future  generations  are  not  present  to  validate  and  hold  us 
accountable for how their interests are represented, new interpretations of accountability 
are needed. Deliberation suggests that accountability means justifying our decisions to 
future generations  as  if  they were currently alive.  This  implies entertaining  policies 
posterity could not reasonably reject. In other words, present people are deliberatively 
or  discursively  accountable  to  posterity.  Accountability  to  the  future  is  therefore 
exercised through a process of public reason-giving that aims to justify our actions to 
the posterity. Discursive accountability essentially means careful reasoning to arrive at 
principles neither the present nor future people could reasonably be expected to reject. 
Decisions have to backed by reasoned explanations that could plausibly be backed by 
posterity. Thus, deliberation does not impose decisions on either the present or future 
people, but instead renders them more legitimate.
One could criticize the above interpretation of accountability as too weak, especially 
given  the  threat  of  intergenerational  domination.  But  it  should  be  noted  that  even 
deliberation can act as a significant check on power. Open and free deliberation is a 
barrier to concentration of power, because it slows down decisions and renders them 
subject to public criticism and scrutiny.  Public deliberation therefore has an important 
power-checking  function  that  aids legitimacy  of  democratic  decisions. (Ekeli  2009, 
456.)  Future-oriented  deliberation  is  part  of  the  checks  and  balances  that  protect 
posterity  against  present  majority  decisions  that  do  not  give  consideration  to  their 
interests.  It  is  therefore  a  block against  the  unlimited  power  the  present  generation 
wields.  Yet  this  obstacle  cannot  be  overly  rigid  either  not  to  violate  democratic 
sovereignty  of  each generation.  While  deliberative  representation  is  more  genuinely 
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democratic across generations, it cannot guarantee posterity's interests because there are 
no guarantees in democracy. Deliberative representation of posterity makes democracy 
as future-oriented as possible, while still retaining each generations right to sovereignty. 
Especially deliberative mini-publics such as citizens’ assemblies do well in combining 
both legitimacy and effectiveness in representing the future.
Deliberation,  especially when compared to more stringent institutional restrictions, is 
inherently democratic and promotes more inclusive decision-making across generations. 
This is not merely restricted to representation of posterity's interests, but also improving 
how  today’s  disenfranchised  voices  are  heard.  Deliberative  methods  improve  the 
representativeness and inclusiveness of the whole political system by including wider 
array  of  perspectives.  Deliberation  is  also  often  accompanied  by  selection  of  the 
participants through random sortition, so to ensure variety of viewpoints. It is a central  
deliberative  ideal  that  all  the  affected  parties,  within  and  across  generations  are 
represented  in  the  public  discourse.  Indeed,  deliberation  enhances  democratic 
legitimacy by involving those who are affected by the policies in making them. If the 
interests  of  affected  parties,  like  future  generations  are  not  considered,  democratic 
legitimacy is undermined. (Ekeli 2009, 444.)
Depolarization
As discussed in the first chapter, increasing political polarization and partisanship has 
arisen as  one of  the  main  obstacles  to  long-term policy-making.  Political  landscape 
characterized by tribal allegiances devoid of common values is not conducive to long-
term policy-making.  If  one’s  political  opponents  are  seen  as  immediate  and hostile 
threat,  intergenerational  concern  is  unlikely  to  manifest  itself  in  decision-making. 
Moreover,  instituting  reforms  that  safeguard  future  generations  require  cooperation 
across political aisles. Deliberation can counter this by encouraging respectful and civil 
discourse. Respectful discussion helps us empathize with others and understand their 
viewpoints better. Deliberation has been found to foster an expanded collective identity 
and  a  common  voice  (Felicetti,  Gastil,  Hartz-Karp  &  Carson  2012).  Deliberation 
therefore  lessens  societal  divisions  and  contributes  to  strengthening  of  democracy 
(Dryzek  et  al.  2019).  Moreover,  deliberative  democracy  can  empower  citizens  to 
identify and pursue shared social  objectives  and long-term goals  (MacKenzie  2018, 
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258).  Bringing  people  together  in  deliberative  environment  facilitates  trust  between 
them.  The mutual  trust  breeds greater  consensus on policy issues and enables  us to 
consider how future generations are affected by them. Requiring greater consensus for 
policies to be passed also reduces viability of extreme polarization as a political strategy 
and forces different parties to cooperate for the common good.60  As such deliberation is 
the central antidote to polarization.
The depolarizing effect of deliberation is especially important because otherwise some 
of the institutions and reforms enacted to better safeguard the future might be turned 
against themselves. Such abuse would allow parties or interest groups to advance their 
own  narrow  short-term  interests.  For  example,  legislative  tools  such  as  delaying 
legislation or veto powers could be abused in partisan manner to obstruct governance, 
like has already happened in the United States  congress.  Some of the proposals for 
future representatives also grant judiciary a significant amount of power, which can be 
problematic  if  courts  reflect  the  wider  polarization  of  society.  Some  authors  have 
criticized  deliberation  for  leading to  group polarization,  because discussion between 
like-minded individuals tends render their viewpoints more extreme (Sunstein 2009). 
While group polarization is a threat,  this criticism is misguided because deliberation 
specifically refers to discussion between people who represent plurality of views. In 
fact, most deliberative institutions take explicit steps against polarization by measures 
like moderators, discussion rules, balanced information and expert testimonies. Findings 
from mini-publics indicate that groups actually tend to become less polarized during 
deliberation  as  people  learn  from variety of  views and partial  beliefs  are  countered 
(Grönlund,  Herne  &  Setälä  2015).  This  indicates  that  it  is  precisely  the  lack  of 
deliberation that leads people to more extreme viewpoints.
Uncertainty
Deliberation can relieve the epistemic uncertainty related to the future in at least two 
respects:  judging consequences  of our actions  and imagining posterity's  preferences. 
First, most of the long-term problems are complex because of how they intersect with 
60 Relatedly, deliberation is also an obstacle against polarization ever emerging because the discursive 
process restricts polarizing authoritarians seeking to abuse power. As polarization is often connected 
to the feeling of marginalization and not being heard in the decision-making, greater representation of 
different interests within a deliberative setting can also prevent polarization from arising.
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other issues (MacKenzie 2016, 286). Especially long-term impacts of policies can be 
hard to model and understand, due to their many variables. These problems are often 
dubbed wicked problems, because of their unique, unknowable interdependencies and 
resistance to simple solutions (Rittel & Webber 1973). Deliberation can help us gain a 
better understanding of these interrelated issues. Bringing people together to think and 
deliberate  over  complex  issues  enables  us  to  pool  our  knowledge,  experiences,  and 
insights  from various  sources  to  better  understand the issue (Ekeli  2009,  459).  The 
broad range of  perspectives  subject  to  critical  scrutiny  breeds  novel  and innovative 
solutions to shared threats. Diverse, interdisciplinary knowledge can improve quality of 
decisions under uncertainty and lead to more informed and enlightened decisions. By 
gaining a more comprehensive understanding of long-term policy issue we can expand 
the information basis of decision-making and more accurately gauge how our actions 
affect posterity. (Ekeli 2009, 442-444.)
Secondly,  and  perhaps  more  importantly,  uncertainty  regarding  posterity's  various 
interests is also alleviated by deliberative means. Perspective-taking helps us imagine 
what interests future generations might hold, especially in relation to their autonomy. 
Through common discourse we can  better  judge which  measures  future  generations 
could  be  reasonably  expected  to  endorse  in  order  to  safeguard  their  autonomy.  It 
encourages people to imagine variety of futures and possible interests  people within 
those futures could hold. In fact, the diversity of perspectives within current population 
is likely a good mirror for the ones find in future generations. Deliberation enhances the 
level of reflection among the representatives,  resulting in a greater  clarity regarding 
future generations preferences. As Karnein (2016, 96) argues, deliberation reduces the 
epistemic  difficulty  of  representing  future  to  its  inevitable  core  and  addresses  the 
problem of value plurality. It enables us to imagine more sincerely which policies could 
be feasibly accepted by posterity if they were present today.
4.4. Instituting deliberation
Based on the above, deliberation can play an essential part in creating a presence for 
posterity and curbing the empathy gap in decision-making. The pervasive uncertainty of 
the future combined with human biases means that future-oriented deliberation is one 
our  best  options  in  representing  future  generations.  The  beauty  of  deliberative 
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institutions  is  that  they  simultaneously  address  the  motivational,  epistemic,  and 
legitimacy  challenges  of  representing  future  generations.  They lessen  the  appeal  of 
short-sighted self-interest and create incentives for decision-makers to care about the 
long-term. Institutions designed to represent future generations should therefore be built 
around deliberation,  preferably including ordinary citizens,  like in the case of mini-
publics. This educative approach is needed to motivate the wider public to take a more 
long-term,  intergenerational  view of our common issues. Without public backing no 
future-focused institution is likely to succeed. Of course, the success of deliberation is 
reliant  on  how well  posterity's  interests  are  actually  represented  in  the  deliberative 
process. Deliberative mini-publics have repeatedly shown that citizens are capable of 
taking  long-term  decisions  with  future  generations  in  mind.  To  what  degree  such 
deliberation should involve specific future representatives is an open question – such 
representatives  might  help  ensure  that  citizens  overcome  biases  of  common  sense 
morality and actually do adopt enlarged long-term perspective.
The  interests  of  future  generations  can  be  represented  in  public  deliberation  even 
without  genuine  future  representatives.  Deliberative  mechanisms  like  public  reason-
giving mean  that  deliberation  can  encourage  long-term thinking  even if  no specific 
representatives of the future are present (MacKenzie 2018, 256). Karsten Klint Jensen 
argues that the interests of posterity might be better served by promoting deliberative 
consideration of the future, rather than by establishing specific proxy representatives. 
This is because strong representation might violate democratic ideals, such as political 
equality and autonomy of the present. (Jensen 2015, 548.) However, institutionalization 
of the deliberation is important for directing it towards the long-term. This is where 
future  representatives  can  provide  valuable  input  and  framing  to  the  deliberative 
process. While future representatives are not necessarily required for successful citizen 
deliberation, they might complement it in valuable ways. Ombudsman who advocates 
on behalf of posterity and brings their interests forward in public discussion might be 
useful  in  creating  initial  presence  for  posterity  in  the  deliberation.  Afterwards, 
deliberative mechanisms themselves act as a strong deterrent against short-termism. In 
practice,  the deliberative institutions might  be explicitly oriented towards the future: 
citizens' assembly might be specifically tasked to consider viewpoint of the posterity.  
Perhaps a certain number of the participants would be assigned role of a future person. 
Long-term impact assessment of policies might also be subject to citizens assemblies. 
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Deliberation  can  both  be  integrated  into  existing  legislative  processes  or  scaled  up 
through aggregating results of mini-publics across the society (MacKenzie 2018, 264). 
The opportunities here are numerous. Indeed, as Bovenkerk (2015, 511) says, public 
deliberation can be successfully used to represent future generations, as long as the type 
of representation itself remains pluralistic, open for debate, and revisable in the future. 
While future-focused citizen deliberation might be made part of the decision-making 
procedure  in  the  constitution,  this  has  to  be  left  amendable  to  facilitate  different 
interpretations of this duty. Posterity has to be able to amend policies and procedures 
that have turned out to run counter to their conceptions of the good. 
As  intergenerational  domination  arises  partly  due  to  deep  moral  deficiencies, 
deliberation plays an important educational function by the virtue of perspective-taking. 
It can motivate citizens both emotionally and rationally to consider the interest of future 
generations.  Furthermore,  this  lessens  the  epistemic  challenges  of  anticipating 
consequences  of  our  actions  and  how  they  affect  posterity.  Unlike  specific 
representative  reforms,  deliberation  affects  the  whole  political  and  societal  system, 
making it more future-oriented. This is welcome given the human tendency to succumb 
into moral  corruption  and short-termism.  The threat  of  intergenerational  domination 
requires power checks and accountability mechanisms to be introduced to the political 
system.  Deliberation  functions  as  a  check on power  of  the  present,  by limiting  the 
degree to which decisions are subject to the unlimited will of myopic majorities (Ekeli 
2009,  456).  Present  decision-makers  can  be  held  discursively  accountable  for  their 
policies. While curbing intergenerational domination requires robust restrictions on the 
power  of  current  majorities,  these  restrictions  can  themselves  violate  generational 
sovereignty.  Deliberation aims to strike a delicate balance between effectiveness and 
legitimacy of representing the future generations by creating procedural limitations on 
the  use  of  power,  while  still  respecting  each  generation's  self-determination.  As 
deliberation  is  inherently democratic  and respects  sovereignty of  each generation,  it 
cannot  guarantee  that  democratic  majorities  will  always act  in  the  best  interest  of 
posterity.  Yet this is an unrealistic goal as such guarantees would violate democratic 
rights of the present people. While one cannot enforce others to care for posterity, they 
can  establish  impersonal  and  impartial  instruments  that  do  so,  such  as  citizen 
deliberation.  Deliberation  represents  our  best  option  in  balancing  legitimacy  and 
effectiveness of representing the future.
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5. Conclusion
Humans  have  evolved  in  small,  technologically  deprived  communities,  where  one's 
actions  only  had  local  consequences.  This  has  also  influenced  our  common  sense 
morality,  which  tends  to  be  restricted  to  those  closest  to  us  both  spatially  and 
temporally.  This  is  further  reflected  in  the  current  political  systems  that  are 
systematically biased in the favor of present generation. Yet now humanity is capable of 
wrecking unprecedented havoc across the planet, impacting far-off future generations in 
irreversible ways, as demonstrated by the climate crisis. In this thesis I have argued that 
climate  change  and  even  many  of  its  possible  remedies  are  instances  of 
intergenerational domination, where the present generation subjugates future in a way 
that is inimical to their autonomy. This is not merely about affecting future generations 
but determining conditions of their  actions. Posterity is subject to superior,  arbitrary 
power of the present without a chance of exiting this relationship. I have defended this 
structural  conception  of  intergenerational  domination  against  insufficiently  narrow 
neorepublican  interpretations.  When  an  agent  is  in  position  to  arbitrarily  shape 
conditions of another agent's actions, the latter is dominated because this violates her 
autonomy. The fact that the current generation  poses unconstrained power to impose 
their own values and preferences on posterity violates the fundamental human need to 
autonomy and freedom.
This structural power disparity calls for  institutional restrictions on the power of the 
present generation. Representation of future generations in decision-making can act as 
power  check  on  the  relation  and  introduce  accountability  to  the  picture.  Yet 
constitutionally entrenched representation can also threaten autonomy of generations to 
come and impose  costs  on  democratic  ideals  if  not  carefully  designed and open to 
amendments.  Any attempt to represent interests of posterity therefore has to balance 
between democratic legitimacy and effectiveness. I have argued that due to challenges 
of  legitimacy,  uncertainty  and  human  biases  we  ought  to  represent  the  posterity's 
interests  through  public  deliberation.  While  we lack  knowledge  of  posterity's  exact 
preferences, we can know enough to safeguard the conditions that empower them to 
make  these  choices  for  themselves.  Deliberation  can  lead  the  public  to  take  the 
perspective of future generations and internalize their interests, namely autonomy. This 
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way  public  deliberation  can  foster enlarged,  long-term  thinking  in  pursuit  of  the 
common good. The present generation is discursively accountable to posterity under 
such  model.  Indeed,  evidence  from  deliberative  mini-publics  suggest  that  public 
deliberation can be used to represent future generations,  leading to more sustainable 
long-term  policy  choices.  Deliberation  balances  between  these  issues  by creating 
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